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  This research aims to uncover the forces that led to the intense nature of the 
1997 financial crisis in Indonesia.  While the crisis struck many countries in Asia, 
Indonesia was particularly hard hit.  By examining the how the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange and the Indonesian Rupiah reacted to news events during the crisis, this 
research seeks to identify which kind of news events where most responsible for 
Indonesia’s volatility during the crisis.  Where market players taking cues from the 
IMF and external credit rating agencies during the crisis or were they responding to 
events inside of Indonesia? 
  The core data for this research are daily rupiah-U.S. dollar exchange rates and 
Jakarta Stock Market index quotes from July 1997 until October 1999.  To analyze the 
variation in the data, news variables based on the Dow Jones News Service and other 
news outlets are used.  Three main methods are used to analyze the interaction 
between markets and news.  First I identify a set of key events using headlines from 
the New York Times.  For each event I analyze the movements of markets during that 
period.  Next rather than start with top news stories, the top 50 market movements for 
both the rupiah and Jakarta Stock Exchange are identified.  The news events behind 
these movements are analyzed to determine which types of news (political, policy-
related, international, civil unrest, etc.) drove the markets during this tumultuous 
period.  Lastly indicator variables representing the various types of news are regressed 
separately on the daily quotes for the rupiah and the stock exchange.    This gives a 
more exact measure of the impact of each type of news category.  Testing for changes 
in the regression coefficients over time allows me to identify the most intense part of 
the crisis. 
 A consistent picture of the crisis emerges from these three methodologies.  
First we see that the rupiah is more volatile than the Jakarta Stock Exchange index.  
The currency responds vigorously to both good and bad news while the stock market 
is less affected by bad news and consistently buoyed by good news.  While the stock 
market may have lost considerable value because of the declining exchange rate, that 
aside, the market seemed to do relatively well considering the severity of the crisis.  
The importance of domestic news events also stands out.  Although the 
announcements of international agencies like the IMF and World Bank were an 
important part of the crisis, the three key sources of domestic news have larger 
impacts: politics, policy, and civil unrest.  This research shows that many of the events 
that sustained the crisis where not external to Indonesia.  This research is able to give 
quantitative credence to the popular idea that Indonesia’s crisis transformed over time 
from a financial/economic crisis to a political/social crisis. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
  Now several years removed from the Asian financial crisis the story of the 
crisis and the large impact it had on Indonesia is well known.  At the center of this 
crisis was the free falling rupiah.  Azis, Thorbecke and Thorbecke (2003) describe the 
numerous areas that were impacted by this depreciating exchange rate:  falling 
domestic investment, rising price levels, increased cost of imported manufacturing 
inputs, decreased household consumption, and increased poverty.   At the same time 
fluctuations in the stock market both reflected and decreased investor confidence in 
Indonesia and greatly affected the value of Indonesian firms.  Thus given the 
substantial impact of the exchange rate and stock market (both directly and indirectly) 
on the Indonesian economy during the crisis a story about the roller coaster ride they 
took would be worth telling. 
  This paper aims to give a multi-faceted view of how the stock market and 
rupiah reacted to the myriad number of events and news items that made up the crisis.  
Specifically the aim is to identify the types of news stories that drove the markets 
during the crisis.  During the crisis there was a constant chorus of blame for the 
quagmire that much of Asia found itself in.  Was it the IMF and its insistence on high 
interest rates, the credit rating agencies and their sudden reversals on the viability of 
Asian investments or was it domestic instability that drove the markets to large and 
sudden swings?    This research seeks to sort out these issues, not in order to assess 
blame but to see how these domestic and international issues came together to affect 
the Indonesian markets. 
  What we find is that domestic news was a main driver of the markets during 
the period.  Indonesian politics and policy were the main movers of the markets, with 
good news in these areas having an especially large impact.  Although bad news
1  
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pertaining to international agreements did indeed weigh heavy on the markets, 
particularly the rupiah, the main source of bad news for both the rupiah and the Jakarta 
Stock exchange was civil unrest in Indonesia itself.    Thus it appears that actors within 
Indonesia where responsible for the intensity of the crisis rather than it being the result 
of forces outside of Indonesia.  This coincides with Ali and Brasukra’s (2004) finding 
that government actions and domestic instability affected dollar denominated stock 
returns much more than IMF-related news.  However, finding that the markets were 
responding to domestic news not completely diminish the importance of external 
forces on the severity of the crisis.  The intensity of the civil unrest in Indonesia and 
the policy adjustments that the government made were certainly influenced by IMF 
and World Bank policies.  For instance, austerity measure like reducing fuel subsidies 
led to increased civil unrest.  While I mainly highlight the direct effects of news items 
in this research such interrelatedness between news categories should be kept in mind.  
Insight into the crisis in Indonesia can help us understand why the impact of 
the crisis was so much larger than for other Asian countries.  While it may seem 
obvious that that the political and social crises that Indonesia underwent separates it 
from its crisis neighbors like Thailand and Korea, without rigorously identifying the 
source of market fluctuations in Indonesia such analysis would remain at the level of 
speculation.  This research seeks to ground such analysis in a detailed study of the 
news events behind Jakarta Stock Exchange and rupiah movements during the Asian 
financial crisis. 
Understanding the structure and impact of news emanating from Indonesia is 
not only germane for understanding the evolution of the crisis in Indonesia.  News 
from Indonesia had significant effects on the stock markets of neighboring countries.  
Kaminsky and Schumkler (1999) examine the news behind the 20 largest stock market 
movements for each of several countries affected by the crisis.  News from Indonesia 
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was responsible for a higher number of swings in these countries than that from any 
other country.  According to their research, news from Indonesia caused 6 and 7 of 
these top 20 markets swings in Singapore and Malaysia respectively, as well as 
causing large market movements in South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.  No 
other country in Asia came close to having such an impact on neighboring markets.  It 
was literally a case of Indonesia sneezing and Malaysia and Singapore catching cold.  
Thus this research seeks to shed light on a key source of market jitters through out the 
region. 
This research covers the period of July 2, 1997 to October 22, 1999.  This 
lengthy time horizon allows us to capture not only the most intense period of the 
financial crisis but also two other important events in Indonesia’s history: the first free 
parliamentary elections after the fall of Suharto and East Timor’s vote for 
independence.  As one might expect the peaceful parliamentary elections led to gains 
for both the rupiah and the Jakarta Stock exchange.  The markets’ reactions to East 
Timor were a little more subdued.  It was only when it looked like the violence in East 
Timor might lead to delays in disbursements in aid to Indonesia that the markets 
started to weaken.  It did not seem that significant international investment pulled out 
of Indonesia only because of the situation in East Timor.  This broad range of events 
and news items corresponds to quite a roller coaster ride for the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange and the rupiah.  This variance in both market and news intensity is utilized 
in this research. 
The main dependent variables used below are the rupiah /US dollar exchange 
rate and the Jakarta Stock Exchange composite index (JSX).  The exchange rate is 
used is an average of the exchange rates listed for Reuters, Telerate and Bloomberg.  
The average of these three rates was used since there is no official exchange rate for 
Indonesia.  Each bank quotes its own exchange rate based not only on trends in the 
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larger economy but also based on their own holdings of rupiah and other currencies.  
Thus there is some slight day to day variation in exchange rates from bank to bank that 
was exasperated during the crisis period.  The three exchange rates are average to 
minimize this source of variation.
1  The JSX composite index is less variable and is 
published by the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  The JSX composite index is not adjusted 
for drops in its value due to the declining rupiah.  Thus it should be kept in mind that 
while we do not observe large drops in the JSX composite over the course of the data, 
there were large declines in the dollar value of Indonesian firms over the period in 
question. 
     The methodology used in this paper is discussed in more detail below, however 
it is useful to discuss the key assumptions here regarding the relationship between 
news and the rupiah and the JSX.  A key assumption used in this paper is that news 
affects the markets relatively quickly.  The regression models used later in the 
research assume that news on a given day affects the markets on that day, while news 
happening near the end of the business day is seen as affecting markets the next day.  
This is based on the belief that those trading in the JSX or rupiah are using the same 
kind of news wire that was used to build the data for this research.  Thus news events 
are made available to trades nearly as soon as they happen.  It is assumed that these 
traders quickly take this information into account in evaluating the rupiah or JSX.  
This belief is confirmed in Cheung and Chin (2001).  They report that US foreign 
exchange traders adjust their positions in response to new economic news in a matter 
of minutes, with significant numbers adjusting in less than 10 seconds.  Thus we 
should expect to find the impact of major news announcements in they day they 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Linda Gozali for pointing out the source of discrepancy between the various 
exchange rate sources. 
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become public.  More details relating to methodology emerge in Sections 2, 3 and 4 
below.  These sections proceed as follows: 
Section 2 uses headlines from the New York Times to define a set of the top 
Indonesia-related news stories for the period in question.  We then look at how these 
stories affected the Jakarta Stock Exchange and the exchange rate.  This gives an 
overview of the main events that gripped Indonesia during the time period in question.  
It also provides a micro-level view of the crisis in detailing each news event before 
turning to more aggregate statistics.  In this overview we see the pattern that emerges 
throughout this research:  the stock market manages to keep its head above water, at 
least somewhat, as the rupiah largely sinks. 
  Section 3 takes a similar approach to section 2, but rather than starting with the 
top news events and moving to market movements, we start with the 50 largest market 
movements and analyze the news stories behind them.  Here we find that political 
news, economic policy announcements and agreements with international agencies 
(like the World Bank or IMF) are the main drivers of both the JSX and the rupiah.  
These news categories account for over half of the top 50 movements for each market.  
In addition civil unrest weighed heavy on the rupiah while having less of an effect on 
the stock market.  In a continuation of a trend from section 3 we see that the JSX has 
more good (increasing index) days than bad (34 out of 50), while the rupiah 
experienced more bad (depreciation) days than good (32 out of 50).  
Sections 2 and 3 largely follow the methodology of Cutler et al (1989).  Cutler 
et al find that non-economic news does account for many of the major stock market 
markets in US history.  They write, “Our inability to identify the fundamental shocks 
that accounted for these significant market moves is difficult to reconcile with the 
view that such shocks account for most of the variation in stock returns.”(p. 9)  
However in these two sections we find that all of the 10 largest movements in the 
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rupiah and the JSX are driven by identifiable news stories.  The analysis in these 
sections gives credence to our further delving into how the news drove the Indonesian 
markets during this crisis. 
  Section 4 uses regression analysis to focus closer on what types of news drove 
the markets during this period in Indonesia.  The rupiah and JSX are regressed 
separately on indicator variables representing various news categories and other 
control variables.  We find that news relating to Indonesian politics and policy had a 
large impact on the markets.  We conclude that while news relating to IMF agreements 
and credit ratings captured much attention during the crisis their roles where 
secondary compared to that of domestic politics and civil unrest in Indonesia.  This 
section also provides a robustness check on our results by comparing them with an 
IMF working paper that examines the issue of contagion in the financial crisis.  That a 
aggregated version of our results matches those of previous results give us confidence 
that his somewhat subjective topic (news) has been handled in a rigorous and careful 
manner. 
 
Section 2: Overview of Top News Stories 
 
Since this research focuses on the effects of various news events, it is only 
fitting that we turn to one of the world’s best-known news sources, the New York 
Times, for our initial overview of the crisis.  Below is a listing of headlines taken from 
the front page (marked by an *) or the first page of the business section for the period 
under consideration, 07/02/97 – 10/22/99.  The list represents, in my opinion, the 
events of the period that were most important in the popular view of the crisis.  The 
list is not exhaustive, but it is intended to give an in-depth view of some of the issues 
that drove the markets during the crisis.  These headlines cover the initial entry of the 
  
7 
IMF, the role of credit rating agencies in the crisis, the showdown between Indonesia 
and the IMF over economic reforms, the unrest of May 1998 and the fall of Suharto, 
the elections and violence in East Timor, and the free elections of a new Indonesian 
government in 1999.  For each of these events we look at how the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange and the rupiah reacted or failed to react.  Also days or weeks following each 
event are analyzed to examine how the markets responded in the wake of the events.   
What will emerge is that rupiah was much more volatile than the JSX during these 
events.  Such a pattern will continue to emerge through out this research. 
 
Table 1 Sampling of New York Times Headlines Covering the Crisis in Indonesia 
 
10/08/1997    I.M.F. AID PLEA BY INDONESIA APPEARS NEAR 
12/23/1997    DEBT RATINGS OF 3 NATIONS IN ASIA CUT 
01/08/1998    U.S. WARNING TO INDONESIA: COMPLY ON AID 
01/09/1998    INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: MARKETS TUMBLE AND RUMORS SWEEP 
                      INDONESIA* 
01/10/1998    PANIC IN INDONESIA REPLACED BY POLITICAL ANXIETY 
01/15/1998    PRESSED BY I.M.F., INDONESIA ACCEPTS ECONOMIC REFORMS* 
05/09/1998    CENTER OF INDONESIAN RIOTS SHIFTS* 
05/13/1998    INDONESIAN RIOT POLICE OPEN FIRE AT PROTESTS, KILLING SIX  
                   STUDENTS* 
05/15/1998    INDONESIAN CAPITAL ENGULFED BY RIOTING* 
05/21/1998    THE FALL OF SUHARTO: THE OVERVIEW: SUHARTO, BESIEGED, STEPS      
             DOWN AFTER 32-YEAR RULE IN INDONESIA*        
08/31/1999    CHOOSING THE FUTURE* 
09/04/1999    IN EAST TIMOR, DECISIVE VOTE FOR A BREAK FROM INDONESIA* 
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Table 1 (continued) 
09/11/1999    MILITIAS IN TIMOR MENACE REFUGEES AT UN COMPOUND* 
09/19/1999    PEACEKEEPERS HEAD FOR EAST TIMOR* 
10/20/1999   STUNG BY DEBATE, INDONESIAN LEADER ENDS ELECTION BID* 
10/21/1999   INDONESIA CHOOSES AN ISLAMIC CLERIC AS NEW PRESIDENT* 
10/22/1999   INDONESIA OPPOSITION LEADER CHOSEN AS THE VICE PRESIDENT* 
(*Front Page Headline) 
 
 
1)  Indonesia Approaches the IMF  (10/7/1997 – 10/10/1997) 
  By October 7, 1997 Indonesia’s exchange rate had depreciated by over 50% 
and the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index had lost almost 30% of its value.  
With no clear end to these falls in sight the Indonesian government publicly 
announced on October 8
th, that  it was approaching the IMF, World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank to ask for assistance in righting its ailing currency.  The 
following day in Washington the IMF announced that it welcomed Indonesia’s request 
and that is was in the process of developing a rescue plan for the country.  The table 
below shows how the markets reacted in the days surrounding these announcements: 
 
 
          Table 2 Markets React as Indonesia Approaches the IMF 
 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change 
  
7-Oct 514   3690   
8-Oct 519 1.00% 3653 -1.00% 
9-Oct 521 0.40% 3528 -3.40% 
10-Oct 535 2.60% 3434 -2.70% 
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Figure 1 Markets React as Indonesia Approaches the IMF 
 
 
 
Both the rupiah and JSX reacted positively to these announcements, with the strongest 
reaction shown by the rupiah on October 9
th, following the IMF’s response.  Good 
sentiment about the possibility of reforms in Indonesia continued to boost both 
markets on Oct 10
th as Indonesian officials continued to make pledges to carry out 
IMF recommendations.  Over this period the JSX rose 4.0 % while the rupiah 
appreciated 6.9%.  Though the reactions were positive the daily movements are rather 
meager when compared to the many violent swings that would be experienced by 
these markets in the following months.  The gains by the rupiah would be lost within a 
week and those by the JSX within two. 
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2) S&P and Moody’s Issue Downgrades  (12/19/1997  - 01/02/1998) 
  Over the course of the financial crisis there was no shortage of downgrades by 
credit rating agencies.  Of the 24 announcements by rating agencies considered later in 
the regression analysis section of this research, 21 are negative.  Yet it was in late 
1997 and early 1998 that these announcements had the most pronounced effects on the 
rupiah.  In somewhat of a dramatic move, on Sunday, December 21, 1997, Moody’s 
announced it was downgrading its ratings on Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea to 
junk bond status.  A little over a week later on December 31
st, while the markets were 
closed for the holiday, Standard and Poor’s lowered Indonesia’s foreign currency 
ratings from BBB- to BB+ and its local currency rating from A- to BBB+.  The table 
and graph below give an overview of how the JSX and rupiah responded to these 
downgrades: 
 
Table 3 Markets React to Credit Ratings Downgrades 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change
       
12/19 378.8     5051  
12/22 385.8 1.9% 5151 2.0%
12/23 397.0 2.9% 5351 3.9%
12/24 396.5 -0.1% 5684 6.2%
12/25 396.5 0.0% 5634 -0.9%
12/26 396.5 0.0% 5102 -9.5%
12/29 398.0 0.4% 5168 1.3%
12/30 401.7 0.9% 5474 5.9%
12/31 401.7 0.0% 5433 -0.8%
1/1 401.7 0.0% 5433 0.0%
1/2 410.0 2.1% 5942 9.4%
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Figure 2 Markets React to Credit Ratings Downgrades 
 
Here we have two contrasting reactions in the JSX and the rupiah.  From the end of 
the day on December 19, 1997 to the end of the day on January 2, 1998 the rupiah 
depreciated 17.6% while the JSX Composite Index gained 8.2% in value.  The rupiah 
depreciated after each of the two announcements, falling 9.4% against the dollar on 
January 2
nd alone.  The rupiah did make one spectacular gain during this period on 
December 26
th, when it appreciated 9.5%.  This appreciation was due to central bank 
intervention over the light holiday trading period.  The graph above dramatically 
shows how quickly the gains achieved by Bank Indonesia were quickly wiped out by 
the Standard and Poor’s announcement. 
  While the rupiah was on a roller coaster ride during this period, the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange was on a moderate upward trend apparently ignoring the ratings 
news.  Overall the JSX was quiet over the holiday period and was closed for more 
days than the Central Bank.  From Dow Jones News reports on those days the market 
seemed to move based more on its own internal trends than any real news from 
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“outside” the market.  We will see again and again that the Rupiah reacts much more 
vigorously to news than the JSX. 
3) Dispute with IMF over the pace of Economic Reforms (1/6/1998 – 1/16/1998) 
  On January 8, 1998 the IMF fired a shot that severely rattled both the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange and the rupiah.  IMF officials were discussing the possibility of 
delaying credit disbursements to Indonesia and the markets correspondingly expressed 
their disappointment.  The reactions were so strong that the following day deputy IMF 
managing director Stanley Fisher was trying to down play the possibility of delays and 
put a rosier spin on the situation.  The IMF’s ire was initially raised by Suharto’s 
announcement late on January 6
th, of the government’s new budget.  Neither the 
markets nor the IMF were pleased with the budget which was seen as lacking 
substantial banking or fiscal reforms.  Eventually after the end of the business day on 
January 14
th, a new agreement between Indonesia and the IMF was announced.  The 
agreement was the result of high-level talks between Suharto and IMF managing 
director Michel Camdessus.  The days preceding the announcement of the new 
agreement were full of anticipation that the resulting reforms would move Indonesia in 
the right direction.  The graph and table below give an overview of this tumultuous 
period: 
Table 4 Markets React to Dispute with IMF 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah  Change 
  
1/6  402     7550  
1/7 394 -2.0%  8050 6.6% 
1/8 347 -12.0%  9650 19.9% 
1/9 343 -1.2%  8333 -13.6% 
1/12 350 2.1%  8750 5.0% 
1/13 382 9.1%  8342 -4.7% 
1/14 404 5.7%  7208 -13.6% 
1/15 387 -4.1%  8383 16.3% 
1/16 414 6.9%  8533 1.8% 
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Figure 3 Markets React to Dispute with IMF 
 
  The table above illustrates how intense of a period this was for both rupiah and 
the JSX.  The rupiah had four swings above 13% (in absolute value) in eight days, 
with seven out of the eight days being above 4.5%.  Similarly the JSX Composite 
Index had movements above 4% in five out of the eight days.  Initially, the rupiah and 
the JSX had double digit falls on January 8
th, yet the following day the rupiah reacted 
strongly to Stanely Fisher’s reassurances as it gained over 13%.  Both the markets 
made gains in anticipation of the new reform package and both fell on January 15
th 
because of initial disappointment once the reforms were announced.  On January 16
th 
the rupiah continued to decline as the JSX rebounded.  The stock exchange seems to 
have had a change of heart and began to feel more optimistic about the reform 
package.  This change of heart gave the Jakarta Stock Exchange a 2.9% increase for 
the period, while the rupiah suffered a 13% depreciation.  The rupiah then experienced 
double-digit depreciations three out of the next five trading days after January 16
th. 
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4) May Unrest (05/05/1998 - 05/22/1998) 
Much of May and June 1998 where tumultuous for Indonesia, while the JSX 
held its ground over those 2 months the rupiah depreciated by 83%.  The most intense 
period of this time was the last few weeks of the Suharto rule.  This period covers the 
prolonged rioting and protests that began in early May to the eventual ascension of 
Habibie to the presidency.  It was a rocky ride for both the rupiah and the Jakarta stock 
exchange during those two and a half weeks. 
Rioting in Medan and continued student protest in early May set the tone for 
this period.  A critical point in the month came when 6 university students were shot 
and killed by Jakarta police during anti-government protests on May 12
th.  Finally on 
May 21
st, Suharto stepped down and B.J. Habibie took over as president. Again, the 
table and chart below give an overview of the period: 
Table 5 Markets React to May 1998 Unrest 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change
5/5 435 8090
5/6 415 -4.7% 9050 11.9%
5/7 437 5.3% 9467 4.6%
5/8 435 -0.5% 8983 -5.1%
5/11 435 0.0% 9200 2.4%
5/12 431 -0.9% 9233 0.4%
5/13 402 -6.6% 10783 16.8%
5/14 404 0.4% 11417 5.9%
5/15 406 0.6% 10842 -5.0%
5/18 389 -4.2% 12483 15.1%
5/19 414 6.4% 12358 -1.0%
5/20 424 2.5% 11317 -8.4%
5/21 424 0.0% 11033 -2.5%
5/22 445 5.0% 11000 -0.3%
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Figure 4 May 1998 Unrest 
 
  During three of the days (5/6, 5/13, 5/18) during this period the rupiah 
experienced significant double-digit depreciations and on each of these days the JSX 
followed by loosing at least 4 percent of its value on each of these days.  Each of these 
falls was triggered by continued violent unrest and protesting.  After May 19
th, when it 
became increasingly clear that Suharto would step down both the stock exchange and 
the exchange rate strengthened.  This rise led to a gain of 2.3% for the JSX over the 
period, yet the rupiah fell sharply over the same period.    Despite an appreciation of 
over 10% in the last few days, the rupiah depreciated 36% during those 2 and a half 
weeks. 
5) East Timor Elections (08/30/1999 – 09/13/1999) 
   The aftermath of the vote in East Timor was a tense and violent time that 
nearly lead to an international military showdown.  Where as the previous unrest in 
Indonesia had been largely a domestic affair, the violence by pro-Indonesian forces 
brought criticism from the United Nations and many of its member nations.   The 
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violence in East Timor played out over several days before an agreement was reached 
for UN-sponsored peace-keepers to take control of the newly independent half of the 
island.  The following chart and table show how the markets reacted to these events: 
 
Table 6 Markets Reacts to Elections in East Timor 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change
8/30 567 7715
8/31 567 0.1% 7687 -0.4%
9/1 572 0.8% 7700 0.2%
9/2 571 -0.1% 7768 0.9%
9/3 565 -1.0% 7844 1.0%
9/6 540 -4.4% 8067 2.8%
9/7 545 0.9% 8297 2.9%
9/8 521 -4.5% 8663 4.4%
9/9 538 3.3% 8605 -0.7%
9/10 563 4.6% 8220 -4.5%
9/13 570 1.2% 7911 -3.8%
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Figure 5 Markets React to Elections in East Timor 
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  Initially there was little or no reaction by the rupiah or the JSX to the largely 
peaceful elections in East Timor and the overwhelming vote for independence from 
Indonesia.  Neither did the initial week of violence bring much reach action from the 
markets.  Only on September 6th, did significant drops occur in both the exchange rate 
and the stock market as the mounting violence lead to threats that Indonesia’s 
international loans could be suspended.  This fall was short lived as bargain hunting 
lifted the JSX on September 9
th, and a sense of calm in East Timor boosted both 
markets on September 10
th.   The JSX and the rupiah both responded positively on 
September 13
th to the news that an agreement had been reached for UN-sponsored 
peacekeepers to land on East Timor.  Overall the JSX was up half a percentage point, 
while the rupiah depreciated 2.5%.     
 
5) National Elections   (6/1/1999 – 6/14/1999) and  (10/12/1999 – 10/21/1999) 
The election of a new Indonesian president was by no means a swift process.  
The initial parliamentary elections were held on June 7, 1999 and it was almost 2 
months before the elections results were verified on August 3
rd.   It was more than 
another 2 months before the Indonesian Assembly elected a new president and vice-
president.  Thus in examining the effects of the elections we will look at both the mass 
elections held in June and the Assembly elections held in October.  In June the period 
will run from the week leading up to the elections until the ruling party, Golkar, 
admits defeat.  Similarly, the October period contains the political jockeying leading 
up to Abdurrahman Wahid’s election as President and the naming of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri as Vice-President.  The tables and charts below plot the markets’ 
reactions to these events: 
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Table 7 Markets React to National Elections 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change
 
6/1 583 8099
6/2 574 -1.5% 8125 0.3%
6/3 588 2.3% 8165 0.5%
6/4 612 4.2% 8048 -1.4%
6/7 682 11.3% 7743 -3.8%
6/8 687 0.8% 7647 -1.2%
6/9 679 -1.2% 7782 1.8%
6/10 665 -2.1% 7713 -0.9%
6/11 668 0.6% 7677 -0.5%
6/14 679 1.7% 7505 -2.2%
 
 
550
580
610
640
670
700
6/1 6/2 6/3 6/4 6/7 6/8 6/9 6/10 6/11 6/14
7000
7200
7400
7600
7800
8000
8200
8400
JSX Change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Markets React to National Elections 
 
  The peacefulness of the elections provided a substantial boost to both markets, 
especially the JSX.  The Jakarta Stock Exchange gained 16.5% over this period, while 
the rupiah appreciated 7.3%.  The biggest gain came on the day of the elections, June 
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7
th.  Other gains were made in the couple of days running up to the elections and on 
June 14
th, in reaction to Golkar conceding defeat.  A similar pattern of gains for both 
the exchange rate and stock market can be seen in the table and chart for the naming of 
the president and vice-president: 
 
Table 8 Markets React to New President and Vice-President 
 
Date JSX Change Rupiah Change 
  
10/12 571 7813  
10/13 572 0.1% 8137 4.1% 
10/14 568 -0.7% 8308 2.1% 
10/15 568 0.0% 7920 -4.7% 
10/18 553 -2.6% 7733 -2.4% 
10/19 584 5.5% 7528 -2.6% 
10/20 584 0.1% 7414 -1.5% 
10/21 616 5.5% 6962 -6.1% 
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Figure 7 Markets React to New President and Vice President 
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Though both the rupiah (10.9%) and the Jakarta Stock Exchange (7.9%) made 
gains during the naming of the president and vice-president, there were some initial 
hesitations in the markets.  The rupiah experienced two days of depreciations as 
Habibie made more of a push for the presidency and chose General Wiranto as his 
running mate.  When Wiranto declined his offer and it became clear that Habibie 
would not retain the presidency, the rupiah went on to five straight days of gains, the 
largest coming on October 21 when Wiranto and Akbar Tanjung withdrew from the 
VP race making it more certain that Megawati would win.  The Jakarta Stock 
Exchange followed less of an overall trend, recording large positive gains on the days 
after Wiranto declined Habibie’s offer and after it seemed Megawati would be elected 
vice-president.  Given Megawati’s large support base, the markets saw her victory as 
assuring a peaceful transition.  Given that Abdurrahman Wahid was more of an unknown 
quantity at the time, his victory did not elicit much of a reaction from the markets. 
 
Table 9 Summary of Market Responses to Major News Events 
    
Event JSX Rupiah*
    
IMF Approached  4.0% -6.9%
Credit Rating Downgrades  8.2% 17.6%
IMF Dispute  2.9% 13.0%
May 1998 Unrest  2.3% 36.0%
East Timor   0.5% 2.5%
National Elections  16.5% -7.3%
Presidential Elections  7.9% -10.9%
    
*Negative value is appreciation.     
 
Remarkably, as seen in Table 9 above, the Jakarta Stock exchange managed to 
rise during each event, while the rupiah lost value in four of the seven events (four out 
of six if we were to count the elections as one event). Also the rupiah’s top three 
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movements in absolute value are depreciations, which are significantly larger than its 
appreciations.  The rupiah was also much more volatile on a daily basis, experiencing 
double-digit movements on 7 of the days under consideration with five of these being 
depreciations.  On the other hand, the Jakarta Stock Exchange only experienced two 
days of moving more than 10%.  The rupiah appears to have been much more 
sensitive to bad news during these events, while not responding with the same vigor to 
good news.  The JSX, on the other hand, at times seemed to be ignoring the news, as 
in the case of the credit rating downgrades, or was able to recoup its loses plus a bit 
more when bad situations turned better, as with the IMF dispute and the May 1998 
unrest. 
If we take a step back we can see that these tendencies are not merely a 
consequence of the events that I have chosen, albeit quite subjectively.  Overall during 
the larger period that this research is concerned with, July 2, 1997 thru October 22, 
1999, similar patterns hold.  At the beginning of this period the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Composite Index stood at 730 and fell to at low as 257 in September of 
1998.  However by the June of 1999 it was back above 700 before ending this period 
at 604.  Thus the index was able to rebound despite loosing more than half of its value 
at one point.  The rupiah was never able to make such a rebound. (And as of this 
writing it shows no signs of rebounding to pre-crisis levels.)   
The rupiah began the period at 2,435 and fell as low as 16,600 in June of 1998.  
The best rebound the rupiah could generate after such a steep slide was to 6,585 in late 
June of 1999, before finishing the period at 6,891.  Just as in the events above the 
rupiah fell farther and did not rebound as much as the JSX index.  Some of this may be 
attributed to the mathematical basics of the two sets of numbers.  The JSX Index in a 
worse case scenario can only fall to zero, which would be a 100% decrease.  However 
since as the rupiah looses value its level increases there is no natural mathematical 
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boundary to how far it can depreciate.  Thus, in some regards, comparing the exchange 
rate and the stock market is a bit like comparing apples and oranges.
2  However the 
multiple approaches applied in this work help to bring forward some reoccurring 
patterns that seem to emerge due to factors other than just the mathematical nature of 
the two indexes. 
Such patterns emerge again in the table below which shows a few descriptive 
statistics that describe the daily percentage changes in the in the rupiah and the JSX 
Composite Index from July 2, 1997 to October 22, 1999 
 
Table 10 Descriptive Statistics of Daily Percent Change 
 JSX Rupiah 
    
Mean 0.01% 0.25% 
Median -0.21% 0.15% 
Standard Deviation  2.81% 3.73% 
Range 25.98% 41.01% 
Minimum -11.95% -21.14% 
Maximum 14.03% 19.87% 
 
 
The mean daily percentage change for the JSX is only barely above zero, while the 
median is below zero.  Thus although there are more negative days than positive ones, 
the larger average values of the market gains pull the mean into the positive range.  
With the rupiah, it is also the case that the mean is greater than the median.  Thus the 
higher values in the positive end of the distribution pull the mean above the median 
                                                 
2 However the apparent strong performance of the JSX should not be over emphasized.  The real value 
of Jakarta stock exchange holdings did fall significantly over this period since Indonesian firms are 
valued in rupiah.  Thus even quite substantial gains by the JSX would not counterbalance the significant 
loses in firm value due to depreciation of the rupiah.  In this paper I assume that the JSX and the rupiah 
are independent in order to produce a set of clear results.  Yet it should be kept in mind that the two 
markets are quite interdependent. 
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and well above zero.  However, the positive direction for the rupiah indicates 
depreciation.  Thus we see more days of depreciation for the rupiah than appreciation 
and larger on average depreciations than appreciations. 
  The increased volatility that was witnessed for the rupiah in the event analysis 
above can also be seen in the descriptive statistics.  The standard deviation for the 
rupiah is nearly a percentage point higher than the JSX index and the range of the 
movements is nearly 15 percentage points greater (41% versus 26%).  Thus the 
patterns that emerge are similar to those seen in the analysis of major news events 
above.  In the next section we will merge the two approaches above by looking more 
closely at what types of news drove the largest rupiah and JSX movements.  Rather 
than taking news events individually as we did above, the emphasis will be on drawing 
conclusions about what news categories moved the markets. 
 
Section 3: The 50 Largest Market Movements 
 
  This section brings us closer to a picture of what kinds of news events moved 
the Jakarta Stock Exchange and the rupiah.  Here again the methodology of Cutler et 
al (1989) and of Kaminsky and Schmukler(1999) was influential.  The basis of this 
exploration is a ranking of the 50 largest single-day percentage movements for the 
JSX and the rupiah during the period from July 2, 1997 to October 22, 1999.  For each 
of these days I have consulted the market analysis articles in the Down Jones News 
Service, Dow Jones International News, and the Jakarta Post to find what analysts 
viewed as the cause of the day’s volatility.  In most cases I have focused on a single 
major event, rather than the multitude of news events that affect the markets on any 
given day.  However when two news events conspire to move the markets on the same 
day I have listed them both. 
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  In order to facilitate a more complete understanding of these market 
movements each news event has been classified into various categories.  There are six 
main categories of news and a few minor categories that were used to label news that 
did not fit neatly into the first six.  These six categories are ones that play an important 
role in both this section and the subsequent section which uses regression analysis. 
Thus a brief description is in order:  1) Civil Unrest (CU) – Civil Unrest covers news 
relating mainly to violent protests, riots, and equally violent reactions on the part of 
the police force or army.  2) Credit Ratings (CR) – This category covers ratings 
changes by international agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.  3) 
Economic - This refers to news about the state of the domestic economy, which 
mainly stems from reports on the release of economic data such as inflation figures 
and the size of public and private foreign debt.  4) International Agreements (IA or 
international) – This category applies not only to bilateral and multilateral loan 
agreements between Indonesia and other countries and international agencies, but also 
to the political events directly related to such agreements.  5) Political – The emphasis 
here is on the domestic politics and political dialogue.  6) Policy – This relates to the 
announcement of new government policies and reforms, both monetary and fiscal in 
nature.
3  As we shall see in the discussion below there are other categories of news (or 
lack of news) that drive the markets, but these categories are more or less unique to 
either the JSX or the rupiah and are not covered in the section covering regression 
results.  Categorizing these news events allows us to layout some stylized facts and 
                                                 
3 These categories were directly influenced by Kaminsky and Schmukler(1999).  The eight categories 
that they used to rank that 20 largest single-day price changes in 9 Asian markets were polictical, 
economic, capital controls, fiscal policy, monetary policy, international agreements, credit ratings and 
no news.  I have essentially used their categories condensing fiscal policy and monetary policy into one 
policy category (because of lack of sufficient data for the regression analysis) and I have added the civil 
unrest category.  These subjects will be discussed further in the next section of the paper. 
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charts that will give insight into the nature and timing of large swings in the markets 
during the crisis.  We will begin by addressing the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
  The entire list of the 50 largest single movements can be found in the 
appendix, below is a summary of the list: 
 
Table 11 Summary of Jakarta Stock Exchange: 50 Largest Single-Day Movements 
                                      (7/02/1997 - 10/22/1999) 
 
   Average
Rise Fall Total  
Absolute 
Change
          
Political 7 3 10    6.62%
Policy 6 3 9    8.01%
International Agreement  6 1 7   8.56%
Wall Street  4 2 6   6.56%
Rupiah 3 2 5    6.48%
Civil Unrest  0 3 3   5.79%
Economic 1 0 1    5.68%
Corporate 1 0 1    6.07%
Wrong Way  2 0 2   5.31%
No News  7 2 9   6.23%
          
Total with overlaps
4 37 16 53    
Total 34 16 50     
          
Average 6.75% 6.97% 6.82%     
Absolute Change      
 
This table shows the number of rise and falls in the JSX caused by each category, the 
absolute average percentage change for each news category and the overall absolute 
average percentage change for days of market gains and loses and for all 50 of the 
days.   In addition to those categories described above, three additional categories are 
                                                 
4 Sums to 53 since 3 days are covered by 2 news categories for each day. 
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included in this list.  Wall Street describes those fluctuations that were attributed to 
previous changes in the American equity markets.  Rupiah indicates those days when 
the JSX was mainly responding to the Indonesian exchange rate.  Corporate indicates 
news about corporations listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  Lastly “wrong way” 
and “no news” encompasses the market reacting in an unexpected way to news events 
and the market reacting in the absence a major news story respectively. 
One thing that stands out in this table is that the number of days of market 
gains (34) is more than double the number of days (16) in which the JSX fell in value.  
Thus we can see that the stock exchange was very responsive to good news.  However, 
the average change on days when the JSX lost ground (6.97%) is slightly larger than 
on the days of market gains (6.75%).     In all of the categories except civil unrest 
positive days outnumber negative days.  The table also shows the dominance of 
political and policy news in these largest market changes.  Since these are basically 
domestic categories we can see that moving the stock exchange was not completely 
out of the Indonesian government’s control.  The JSX seems to have responded very 
positively when it was given reason to.  Yet this focus on domestic politics and policy 
should not be over emphasized, news surrounding international agreements played a 
large role in these market fluctuations.  Looking at the average absolute change by 
category we see that the movement caused by international agreements (8.56%) is 
more than half a percentage point higher than the next closest category, policy, and 
almost two percentage points higher than the overall average of 6.82%.  With only one 
out of the seven days attributed to international agreements being negative, we can see 
this source of news as a positive engine in the market. 
While agreements with and statements by international organization like the 
IMF were important to the market, they were not the only source of foreign inspiration 
for the markets.  Large movements on Wall Street were responsible for more than 10% 
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of these largest swings in the JSX composite index.  In each case moving in same 
direction as the major American indexes, although the magnitude of the swings in the 
JSX were not consistently more or less than those on Wall Street.  While the JSX often 
had its finger on the pulse of national or international sources, many times it moved 
more in-line with its own internal rhythms. 
On almost one-fifth of the 50 days the Jakarta Stock Exchange made 
significant movements without a stimulus from outside news, including two cases in 
which it made significant gains in the face of major negative domestic news.  On May 
7, 1998 the JSX composite index a 5.3% gain in face of interest rate hikes of between 
4% and 12%.
5  The JSX rose on the back of arbitrage buying in telecommunication 
stocks in the wake of recent falls in share prices.  On Monday November 23, 1998 the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange again rose 5.3%, despite weekend religious violence that left 
six dead in Jakarta.  Here the market was riding a trend of five straight days of 
increases amid an inflow of foreign funds.  In the nine days of “no news” there were 
similar explanations for the movements of the composite index, including profit 
taking, blue-chip buying, and regional “influxes” of capital.
6  Thus stock exchange is 
not merely a mass of traders responding to news.  Traders are actively attempting to 
maximize their profits and often this may mean bucking a current trend or following a 
trend that may seem to go against conventional wisdom.  Despite the continued 
turbulence in Indonesia there were often buyers willing to “prop up” the market in the 
midst of a downfall in the belief that the prices had fallen enough to make them 
attractive. 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately for the central bank the rupiah continued to fall despite the interest hike. 
6 For more on this phenomena of stock market moving in the absence of news see Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (p. 546).  They quote Kaminsky(1998) stating that half of the major stock movements since 
the beginning of the 1980’s have not been traceable to the appearance of news.  Thus the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange is not unique in this regard.  Though as mentioned in regards to Cutler et al (1989) above, the 
largest movements of the JSX were the results of specific news events. 
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On five of the fifty days the market’s reactions were driven by changes in the 
rupiah.  In each case stock market made gains when the rupiah strengthened and 
incurred losses when it weakened.  This kind of reaction would be expected since 
value of much of Indonesian corporate debt was tied to the exchange rate since much 
of it was foreign denominated and unhedged.  Table 12 below will give us insight into 
the reasons for the largest changes in the value of the rupiah, again the list of the 50 
largest movements is listed in its entirety in the appendix. 
 
Table 12 Summary of Rupiah: 50 Largest Single Day Movements 
(7/02/1997 - 10/22/1999) 
               Average
     Appreciation Depreciation Total  
Absolute 
Change
                
Political     3  9  12  9.60%
Civil Unrest    0  10  10  11.51%
Policy     6  4 10  10.42%
International 
Agreement  5 3  8  12.19%
Economic   0  5  5  9.60%
Yen     2  1  3  9.56%
Credit Ratings    0  2  2  7.68%
Brazil     0  1  1 5.97%
Intervention   1  0  1  9.45%
Taxes     1  0  1 5.93%
                
                
Total with 
overlaps
7  18  35  53   
Total     18  32  50   
                
Average     9.16%  10.67%  10.28%   
Absolute 
Change                
                                                 
7 Sums to 53 since 3 days are covered by 2 news categories for each day. 
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In addition to our six main categories, there are four additional categories for the 
rupiah.  The most of important of these is “Yen” which represents days when the 
rupiah moved in response to the changes in the value of the Yen.  The other three 
categories only cover a single event that did not easily fit into any of the pre-existing 
classifications.  “Brazil” indicates when the rupiah lost ground due to the financial 
crisis in Brazil.  “Intervention” is the one instance that the central bank was seen as 
largely responsible for the day’s change in the rupiah and “taxes” accounts for the day 
when corporations were buying rupiah in anticipation of having to pay Indonesian 
taxes the next week. 
  Just as was the case in the previous section, the overall movements of the 
rupiah are in sharp contrasts to those of the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  The rupiah 
experienced nearly twice as many depreciations as appreciations and the size of the 
depreciations were 1.5% higher, on average, in absolute value.  The categories rank in 
a similar fashion to the JSX, policy and political again account for about one-fifth of 
the movements, with policy again having a slightly higher average impact in the 
absolute value of the percentage changes.  However in the case of the stock exchange 
both political and policy were responsible for more gains than loses, but for the rupiah 
the two news categories had opposite effects.  Political news caused appreciations in 
only three out of the twelve cases, while policy news strengthened the rupiah six out 
of ten times. 
  News pertaining to international agreements joins policy news in being a 
positive influence on the rupiah with five out of eight news events resulting in 
appreciations. Also just as international agreements were responsible for the largest 
movements in absolute value for the Jakarta Stock Exchange, this is also the case for 
the rupiah (12.2%).  This is more than four percentage points higher than the effect of 
  
30 
international agreements on the JSX.  There is a similar disparity in the overall 
average absolute percentage change between the exchange rate (10.3%) and the stock 
exchange (6.82%).  This disparity is also evident in the differential effects of another 
new category on the two markets. 
  Civil unrest stands out as having a much more profound effect on the rupiah 
than on the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  For the JSX, there were three civil unrest events 
that caused an average fall in the composite index of 5.79%.  In the case of the rupiah, 
there were more than three times as many news events (10), and the average loss 
(11.5%) caused by these events is almost twice as large.  One reason for the rupiah’s 
increased sensitivity to civil unrest could be that the unrest triggered many Indonesia 
citizens, especially Indonesian Chinese, to transfer their money into dollars or other 
safer currencies.  Certainly domestic unrest was accompanied by capital flight.  
Individuals may have felt marginally safer leaving there investments in Indonesian 
stocks than in the rupiah.   
  In addition to being more sensitive to civil unrest, the economy was more of 
factor for the rupiah.  Whereas the economic news triggered one upswing for the JSX, 
it triggered five depreciations for the rupiah.  Yet only one of these five instances was 
the rupiah driven by traditional economic fundamentals.  Aside from the one day with 
news about poor inflation figures the other four cases of economic news pertained to 
foreign denominated debt, especially corporate debt.  Thus, just as the rupiah managed 
to move the stock exchange, the stock exchange indirectly moved the rupiah.  In part, 
it seemed to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Traders in the foreign exchange markets 
became concerned over corporations’ abilities to pay their foreign denominated debt 
once the rupiah, started to depreciate.  This depreciation subsequently made it more 
difficult for the corporations to meet their obligations. 
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  Table 13 below gives an overview of the timing of these top 50 market 
movements: 
 
Table 13 Timing of the 50 Largest Movement of the JSX and Rupiah 
 
      Before 12/9/97  12/9/97-11/3/98  After 11/3/98 
          
 JSX   8  28  14 
        
 Rupiah   3  44  3 
   
An overwhelming majority of the largest movements of the rupiah are clustered 
between December 9, 1997 and November 3, 1998.  Although the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange experienced a similar clustering, nearly half of the JSX movements do fall 
outside of that period.  The rupiah movements are much more centered on the political 
battles with the IMF around the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 and around the 
unrest of May 1998.   
  It is evident from Table 13 that the dates for the 50 most volatile days for the 
rupiah are not the same as the dates for the stock exchange.  Only on eleven dates did 
both the rupiah and JSX composite index both experience moves among the 50 largest 
and on two of these eleven they were moving in the different directions.  These dates 
and the percentage change for the rupiah and JSX are listed in Table 14 below: 
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Table 14 JSX and Rupiah: Overlap Between 50 Largest Single Day Movements 
 JSX Rupiah
 
Date  Percent Motivation   Percent Motivation 
 Change     Change  
      
12/12/97  -7.6% Political    10.7% Political 
12/15/97  -7.2% Rupiah   13.6% Poltical 
1/8/98  -12.0% IA    19.9% IA 
1/14/98  5.7% IA    -13.6% IA 
1/19/98  6.1% Coporate    16.8% Political 
2/2/98  14.0% Policy,  IA    -11.4% Policy 
5/13/98   -6.6% Civil Unrest     16.8%    Civil Unrest
6/17/98   5.0% No News     10.3% Civil Unrest 
6/18/98  4.9% Rupiah   -11.0% Yen 
10/8/98  8.4% Rupiah   -5.9% Policy 
10/21/99  5.5% Political    -6.1% Political 
 
These eleven days are clustered around just a few events, with more than half of them 
occurring in late 1997 and early 1998.  Yet the significance of this table should not be 
overestimated.  Although only eleven of the days overlap, in many instances the 
rupiah and Jakarta Stock Exchange react to the same news however the strength and 
the timing of the reactions can vary significantly. 
  If we examine the dates of these top 50 movements we see that for both the 
rupiah and the JSX swings caused by international agreements tend to be clustered 
around the middle of January 1998.  As we saw above this was a period of intense 
disagreement and dialogue between the IMF and the Indonesian government.  It can 
also be noted that many of the policy announcements tend to be clustered near the 
international agreements events.  This is certainly logical since many of the Indonesian 
policy initiative were in response to IMF negotiations and mandates.  For the rupiah, 
the civil unrest news events are centered around the May 1998, as would be expected.  
Other categories tend to be less clustered than these. 
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  We have seen many consistencies here with the previous section.  The rupiah 
moved with more volatility than the stock exchange and more often experienced large 
scale losses, while the a large movement in the JSX was more often a gain in value.  
Yet as we introduced news categories into the analysis new patterns began to emerge.  
News pertaining to international agreements and Indonesian policy and politics had 
large influences on both the stock exchange and exchange rate.  The JSX tended to 
move on its own internal trends and the rupiah was strongly influenced by bad 
economic reports and civil unrest.  In the next section, we explore the impact of these 
various types of news further using the results from time series regressions. 
 
 
Section 4: Regression Analysis of Market Forces 
 
  The previous sections have used a series of stylized facts and general 
observations to give some insight into exchange rate and stock market movements 
during the financial crisis.  We have observed how the rupiah and JSX composite 
index react to various types of news announcements, finding both similarities and 
differences.  Although insightful, these previous approaches are only meant to give 
broad overviews of what occurred during the crisis. This section will provide an 
additional level of rigor in examining what kind of news drove the markets during the 
crisis.  Here we will use the six categories of news described in the previous section, 
along with a few other daily variables to construct a few different models of the rupiah 
and Jakarta Stock Exchange movements during the crisis.  The rupiah and JSX 
composite index are individually regressed on these news categories to give a more 
precise estimate of how and why these markets moved during the crisis. 
  The model that will be used, in its simplest form, looks roughly as follows: 
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 Y  =  α0 + α1GN + α2BN + α3Yen + α4S&P + α5SBI90 + α6Rupt-1 + α7JSXt-1 
 
Where GN is good news, BN is bad news, Yen is the yen/dollar rate, S&P is the S&P 
500, SBI90 is the 90 day interest rate on Indonesian Central Bank notes, and Rupt-1 
and JSXt-1 are the lagged values of the rupiah and JSX composite index respectively.  
Y may be either the rupiah or JSX composite index.  In what follows, several different 
regression results will be given.  We will gain an overview of the effect of news using 
only two news categories (good and bad).  News categories will also be disaggregated 
into the six categories mentioned above to examine exactly what types of news 
affected the markets.  However, before examining the regression results we will 
carefully consider the methodology, data gathering and classification techniques used 
here. 
  The backbone of this research is the news events that were used to produce 
dummy variables for the regressions.  The main source of news was the Down Jones 
News Service, which is a wire service that is constantly updated as news happens.  I 
searched the daily archives of this newswire from July 2, 1997 through October 22, 
1999.  The search was set up to include all articles that included “Indonesia” in the 
headline or lead paragraph.  I perused the headlines and summaries of each article, 
which meant sifting through over 13,700 articles and news bulletins.  In cases where 
the Dow Jones News Wire did not provide sufficient information on an event, 
information was supplemented and corroborated with news from the Dow Jones 
International News Service, the Jakarta Post, and information from the websites of the 
IMF, Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s Investor Services. When a news event was 
deemed significant (more below on the selection criteria), I copied the article or 
articles about the event to a file.  The timing of each event was carefully noted based 
  
35 
both of the description of the event in the article and the release time of the news 
article.   
Each news event was assigned to a date based on when the event occurred.  
Anything occurring before the end of the business day in Indonesia was assigned to 
that date, regardless of where the event happened.  For instance, an economic 
announcement during the middle of the day in Jakarta, would be considered to effect 
the market that day, however an announcement in the middle of the business day in 
New York (the middle of the night in Indonesia) would affect the Indonesian markets 
the next business day.  Announcements on weekends or holidays were assigned to the 
following business day.
8  The end of the business day in Jakarta is defined as the close 
of Jakarta Stock Exchange, 4:00 p.m. Western Indonesian Time.
9  Dow Jones New 
Service is listed in Eastern Standard Time, so the timing of each event had to be 
converted to Western Indonesian Time.
10  Those events that fell close to the end of the 
business day were considered carefully.  In general if an event occurred within an hour 
of the end of the business day, it was assigned to the following business day unless 
reports indicated that it did indeed affect the market immediately after the news broke. 
After an article was selected it was then categorized into one of six categories: 
civil unrest, credit rating, economic, international agreement, political or policy.  
Within each category the event was then labeled as good or bad news, i.e. good 
political or bad political.  This created a total of eleven classifications since all news 
                                                 
8 For both the rupiah and the JSX holidays were removed.  I received lists of business holidays from 
Hadi Munadi at the Jakarta Stock Exchange.   I also removed from the rupiah days when the Central 
Bank was closed and not conducting clear activities due the unrest in May 1998.  Closings were 
checked again news reports from the Dow Jones.  Although many foreign markets were opened during 
Indonesian holidays, trading on such days was usually very light. 
9 The JSX closing time was chosen since the time of closing is know with certainty.  The closing time 
for the rupiah markets is harder to define.  The rupiah is constantly traded somewhere in the world and 
even within Indonesia there is no single rupiah market.  Various banks will have various closing times 
and different sources of exchange rates will take their quotes at different times.  The problem of timing 
for the rupiah seems to be not much of a factor since the vast majority of news events are not occurring 
at the end of the business day. 
10 Care was also use to take into account Daylight Savings Time in converting the times. 
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under civil unrest was labeled as bad news. This process rests crucially on the 
selection and categorizing criteria that are employed.  It is an inherently subjective 
process since there are no easily quantifiable methods that can be employed in order to 
choose the news events.  Unlike in the section on the 50 largest market movements, 
the goal in this section was to select news that was significant in its own right without 
relying solely on ex post market indications of which news is important.    
 In order to remove as much of the subjectivity inherent in this process as 
possible, I have concentrated on making the methods used transparent and consistent.  
In addition to carefully describing the selection and classification process I will 
provide the news articles used to construct the dummy variables to anyone who is 
interested.
11  This list shows which category an event was placed in and whether it was 
labeled good news or bad news. There is also information on the timing of each event 
both in the form of the time the news was released on the newswire and information in 
the article itself on when the event took place.  The inclusion of the headlines and 
exerts from the news articles is to give as much insight as possible into the how the 
news was selected and categorized. 
The selection of news articles was guided in part by the general criteria used 
by Baig and Goldfajn (1998).  In carrying out similar regression analysis they write, 
“we concentrated on news purely based on the criteria of whether the news event 
represented changes in the fundamentals of an economy.”(p. 30)  I selected news 
events that not only reflected changes in the fundamentals of Indonesia’s economy, 
but also events that were likely to change market players’ perceptions about 
Indonesia’s economy and its political and social stability.  For example a riot in 
                                                 
11 I considered providing the news articles in the appendix of this work it would nearly double the 
length of this thesis.  Please contact me at larrychavis@gmail.com to request the raw news data. 
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Jakarta may not directly change the course of the economy, but it could certainly 
change the markets’ outlook.
  
Ideally one would have full information on market expectations in selecting 
news items and select only events that defied market expectations, in the belief that 
otherwise the news would have already been built into market valuations.  However it 
is very difficult (maybe even impossible) to accurately gauge the markets’ 
expectations.  Rather than focusing on expectations I have focused on selecting news 
items that represented new information.  Although some market players may have 
expected some of the events, the regression results will help us focus on how they 
actually reacted.  Some results will also be compared to previous research to see if we 
are in the same range of results. 
The criteria for selecting news events will become clearer in a discussion of the 
categories that were used to classify the events.  Thus a brief description of each 
category is in order.  Civil unrest was one of the more straightforward categories to 
define.  Civil unrest included news on rioting, looting, religious violence, and violence 
associated with the independence movements in Ache, Irian Jaya, and East Timor.  
Events that particularly stood out were confrontations between government forces and 
civilians, events that involved the wide-scale destruction of property, and those 
incidents where people were killed.  As mentioned, above these events were all 
labeled as bad news, since they tended to have destabilizing effects.  
Credit Ratings reflects changes in credit ratings by international agencies.  The 
main source of this news is again Dow Jones, but it was also checked against lists of 
ratings changes from Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.  Ratings from other agencies 
were included when they appeared in the Dow Jones newswire.  The main focus was 
on foreign currency and country-wide ratings, in a few instance ratings of specific 
companies or groups of companies were included when they seemed to reflect a 
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change in the outlook for a the country as a whole.  Each ratings announcement was 
labeled as good news or bad news according to whether there was a ratings upgrade or 
downgrade. 
Economy represents news related to the fundamentals and economic health of 
Indonesia.  The focus here was on news relating to public and private debt, GDP, 
inflation, trade, and the general direction of the economy.  Much of the news here 
consists of reports and forecasts by international and domestic agencies on the 
Indonesian economy.  Monthly inflation and trade announcements were reviewed in 
the Jakarta Post and those announcements that were reported as significant changes 
were selected.
12  News that reported or predicted rising corporate debt, increasing 
inflation, slowing growth or general economic contraction was labeled as bad news, 
while the opposite trends were labeled good news. 
  International Agreements, in some cases simply labeled international, 
represents news relating to multilateral and bilateral loan agreements.  Two main types 
of news were included: the announcement of new loan packages and news relating to 
the disbursement of existing agreements.  The latter mainly refers to the occasional 
war of words carried out between Indonesian and the IMF, but there were other 
agencies that also announced delays in disbursement of aid at various points during the 
crisis.  Aid was offered to Indonesia through dozens of countries and programs, the 
focus here was on the larger aid agreements, especially over $ 1 billion.  Good news 
was taken as announcements of new aid packages and the disbursements of funds and 
bad news refers to delays in the disbursement of aid. 
  Policy covers economic, fiscal, and monetary policies.  Much of the news 
consists of new policy announcements, with a focus on policies that marked a 
                                                 
12 The logic here is since there is no arbitrary cutoff that can be imposed, I look to the commentary of 
market analysts to decided what where substantial changes in inflation and other economic variables. 
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departure from previous policies.  Many of the policies are the result of IMF 
negotiations, but have been included in a separate section because the emphasis here is 
on potential implementation.  National budget announcements were included as well 
as announcements on future interest rate policy.  Policies also specifically designed to 
stimulate the markets were included.  Policies intended to open up markets and that 
show commitment to reforms were labeled as good news and vice versa.    Also 
included in this category was the only set of news that was labeled differently for the 
rupiah and the JSX.   
News relating to the implementation of a currency board was viewed 
differently in each of the two markets.  News of a currency board was viewed 
positively in the currency markets where the possibility of a board triggered the 
buying of rupiah.  Currency traders felt that when a currency board was implemented 
the rupiah would be pegged closer to its pre-crisis value, which would give everyone 
holding the rupiah an immediate profit.  On the other hand, stock market participants 
had a different reaction to news of a currency board.  They worried that its 
implementation would “tighten liquidity while raising interest rates.”(DJIN 2/12/98)   
Thus news that indicated that a currency board was likely was labeled as good news 
for the rupiah, but bad new for the JSX. 
Political covers news associated with high level Indonesian politics and 
political dialogue.  The main focus of the news is the direction and stability of the 
national government.   Good news is associated with reform and stability and bad 
news with corruption and the status quo.  Much of the news is centered around 
presidential politics and presidential succession.  
In building the models all non-dummy variables were transformed using the 
first difference of the logged values.  The first difference serves to put the emphasis on 
the changes in the variables in a given day.  This allows us to focus on the single-day 
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effects of news events. Taking the log serves to smooth out the data.  Each model also 
uses the yen/dollar rate and the S&P 500 index as a proxy for external effects on the 
markets.  Lagged values of the JSX were used in the modeling of the rupiah and 
lagged values of the rupiah were used in modeling the JSX.  This was done to examine 
if there was a feed-back effect between the two markets.  As we saw in the analysis in 
the previous section we would expect the rupiah to have an effect on the stock market.  
Lagged values, instead of current values, were used to avoid simultinaety bias. 
Each of the models below was put through the normal array of OLS regression 
diagnostics with similar results for all the permutations of the models.  All were found 
to be free of multicollinearity.  Godfrey’s serial correlation test found forth order serial 
correlation for the rupiah and second order serial correlation for the JSX models.  
Serial correlation was not detected after using forth order autoregressive lags for the 
rupiah and second order autoregressive lags for the JSX.   Heteroscedasticity was 
detected in each model using White’s test.  This was corrected for by using White’s 
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.  Jaque-Bera test of normality show 
significant departures from normality for the residuals.  However our OLS estimates 
are still consistent given our large sample size. 
Our initial glimpse at the regression results come by comparing results from 
this study with those of Baig and Goldfajn (1998).  Baig and Goldfajn use a model that 
served as a basis for this research, where the rupiah or stock market is regressed on 
good news, bad news, S&P 500, and the yen/dollar rate.  Since their research was 
carried out in 1998, the time period runs from August 14, 1997 to May 18, 1997.  For 
the sake of comparison I followed their dates and use standard OLS methods.  The 
results are reported in the table below: 
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Table 15 Comparison with Baig and Goldfajn Results (7/02/97 - 5/18/98) 
 
    Rupiah           JSX Composite   
     
   Chavis Baig Chavis   Baig 
                 
F     12.2     8.42      
(p-value)   <.0001 <.0001     
                 
adj-R squared  .19  0.17  0.14  0.11  
                 
                 
Intercept   0.005 0.004  -0.006  -0.0004   
Good News  -0.054*** -0.059** 0.029*** 0.014 * 
Bad News    0.037*** 0.044** -0.006  -0.013 * 
S & P 500  0.307  -0.494  0.540*** 0.725 **
Yen/$   0.247  0.657  -0.082  -0.163   
        
                 
*10%  significance             
** 5% significance               
***1%  significance             
 
Overall the regressions results are similar to those obtained by Baig and 
Goldfajn for both the rupiah and the JSX.  All the signs are the same expect for those 
on the S&P 500 for the rupiah, but neither variable is statistically significant.  Baig 
and Goldfajn find good and bad news significant for both markets, however the results 
of the current research finds that bad news is not significant for the stock market.  Yet 
this is too not surprising considering that in the overview of major crisis events we 
found that during each of the episodes the stock market finished up seemingly 
ignoring some of the bad news that it faced.  This was also the case in the review of 
the 50 largest market movements, where the JSX composite index gained in value on 
two occasions in the face of bad news.  It is reassuring that our results concur with 
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those of Baig and Goldfajn.  We can take this as a sign of the validity of the 
methodology despite the inherent subjectivity in the selection of news events.  Our 
results are similar although our two sets of news articles where chosen independently.   
In considering the Baig and Goldfajn results it seems that considerable 
explanatory value could have been gained by using an interest rate variable and the 
lagged values of the JSX and the rupiah.  The table below shows the Baig and 
Goldfajn results again alongside an expanded model: 
 
Table 16  Comparison of Expanded Model with Baig and Goldfajn Results (7/02/97 – 
5/18/98) 
 
    Rupiah           JSX Composite   
      
   Chavis Baig Chavis Baig   
                 
F     6.62     8.54      
(p-value)   <.0001 <.0001     
                 
adj-R squared  0.21  0.17  0.27  0.11  
                 
                 
Intercept   0.003 0.004  -0.007  -0.0004   
Good News  -0.052*** -0.059** 0.035*** 0.014 * 
Bad News    0.039*** 0.044** -0.007  -0.013 * 
S & P 500  0.362  -0.494  0.660*** 0.725 ** 
Yen/$    0.064   0.657  0.002   -0.163  
JSX-1   -0.181      0.386***   
JSX-2   -0.062      -0.175***   
Rupiah-1   0.022     0.150***    
Rupiah-2   0.149**      -0.055     
SBI90    -0.045     -0.015    
                 
                 
*10%  significance             
** 5% significance               
***1%  significance            
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Here we see a small increase in the adjusted-R
2 for the rupiah, indicating more 
explanatory value in the model.  However, the main increase in explanatory power 
comes in the JSX regression.  The adjusted-R
2 more than doubles and three of the 
lagged values are statistically significant.  The interpretation of the coefficients will be 
discussed more below, but emphasis here is that the expansion of the Baig and 
Goldfajn model should provide more insightful results than previous research. 
  The results of this expanded model are expressed in table 17 below.  In 
contrasts to the the comparison with Baig and Goldfajn above, these regressions cover 
the period from July 2, 1997 to October 22, 1999. As was the pattern above, good and 
bad news are significant for the rupiah and only good news for the JSX Composite 
Index.  The signs on the news variables are what we would expect.  Here the interest 
rate (SBI90) is significant and negative for the rupiah.  This is what we would expect 
from monetary theory.  A rise in the interest rate causes the rupiah to appreciate.  Thus 
interest policy seems, at least in this model, to have had the desired effect on the 
rupiah.  Although the interest rate is not significant for the stock market (p-value = 
0.24), the sign is as would be predicted.  An increase in interest rates may cause the 
stock market to fall, since high interest rates tighten liquidity for corporations. 
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Table 17  Impact of Good and Bad News 
        
 Rupiah  JSX  Composite 
        
F   11.28  19.55 
(p-value) <.0001  <.0001  
        
adj-R squared  0.16  0.23 
        
        
Intercept -0.0001 -0.003*** 
Good News  -0.023*** 0.025*** 
Bad News  0.023*** -0.004 
SBI90  -0.031*  -0.016   
S & P 500  0.039  0.592*** 
Yen/$ 0.185  -0.315** 
JSX-1 -0.142*  0.268*** 
JSX-2 -0.050  -0.056 
Rupiah-1 0.060  0.106*** 
Rupiah-2 0.136*  -0.024 
Rupiah-3 -0.059     
Rupiah-4 -0.146     
        
Observations 574  572 
        
*10% significance       
** 5% significance       
***1% significance       
  
    The lagged variables on the rupiah are more difficult to interpret.  The 
one period lag on the JSX is negative and significant, which would indicate that if the 
stock market fell the previous day the rupiah would depreciate and vice versa. Under 
normal circumstance it may be difficult to substantiate, however during the crisis this 
could be a sign of contagion between the markets.  A falling stock market may create 
an environment where market players feel uncomfortable holding rupiah.  In this 
model the two period lag on the autoregressive lag on the rupiah is significant.  This 
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occurs in many of the models in this section and is indicative of the complex trends 
that carryover in the rupiah from day to day. 
  For the JSX composite index the analysis is more straightforward. The S&P 
500 is positive and significant.  Just as we have observed in other sections, the JSX 
tends to move with the previous day on Wall Street.  The sign on the Yen here is 
negative and significant, which would indicate an appreciation in the Yen would be 
met with a rise in JSX.  This could signal increased buying abroad on the part of the 
Japanese as the Yen strengthens and vice versa.  The positive sign and significance of 
the one period lag on the rupiah could also indicate such a foreign influx of funds.  In 
this case, a depreciation in the rupiah on the previous day would lead to a gain for the 
JSX.  Rather that dragging the stock market down a decrease in value of the rupiah 
against the dollar could be creating bargain hunting for those with dollars.  The one 
period autoregressive lag on the JSX is also positive and significant.  This could be an 
indication of momentum in the market with one day tending to move in the same 
direction as the previous day.  We saw this market in one instance in the previous 
section were the stock market experienced 5 straight days of positive gains.  The 
momentum pushed it to continue to gain despite religious violence in Jakarta that left 
six dead.  The significance of these lagged values could be a sign of the internal 
rhythms of the stock market discussed earlier. 
  In addition to looking at these coefficients overall it is also important to check 
if the coefficients change over the period under consideration.  To this end, a chow test 
was carried out on both the rupiah and JSX regressions.  It indicated there was some 
change in the coefficients and/or the intercept in the periods before and after May 19, 
1998.  This break coincides with the change of leadership in Indonesia from Suharto to 
Habibie.  Thus we now consider two periods, July 2, 1997 – May 19, 1998 and May 
20, 1998 – October 21, 1999.  A new dummy variable is set up to take the value of 1 
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for obsverations that fall in the first period.  Regression are run using a the following 
new model: 
 
Y = α0 + β0Cri + α1GN + α2BN + α3Yen + α4S&P + α5SBI90 + α6Rupt-1 + α7JSXt-1
+  β1 Cri *GN + β2 Cri *BN + β3 Cri *Yen + β4 Cri *S&P + β5 Cri *SBI90 
+  β6 Cri *Rupt-1 + β7 Cri *JSXt-1
 
Here the new dummy variable, Crisis (Cri), is multiplied by each of the variables from 
the previous model.  The coefficients B0 – B7 represent the marginal change in a 
variable during the first period.
13  Thus if β is significant, that we can conclude that 
the effect of that variable is different in the two period.  The table below gives us the 
results of this regression: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 For example, the effect of good news in period one is α1 + β1, while the effect of good news during 
period two is α1.  Thus if β1 is equal to zero the effect of good news is the same in both periods. 
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Table 18  Comparing Crisis periods  (7/2/97 - 10/22/99) 
 
Crisis Dummy = (7/2/97-5/19/98)     
        
 Rupiah  JSX  Composite 
        
F   7.87  10.78 
(p-value) <.0001  <.0001  
        
adj-R squared  0.22  0.25 
        
Intercept -0.002*  -0.002 
Crisis Dummy  0.006**  -0.004* 
Good News  -0.010**  0.020*** 
Bad News  0.012***  -0.002 
SBI90 -0.004  -0.016 
S & P 500  -0.076  0.583*** 
Yen/$ 0.243  -0.417*** 
JSX-1 -0.112*  0.190*** 
JSX-2 -0.032  0.019 
Rupiah-1 0.148*  0.020 
Rupiah-2 -0.057  0.040 
Rupiah-3 0.024     
Rupiah-4 -0.144**     
Good News (Crisis)  -0.037***  0.014** 
Bad News (Crisis)  0.027***  -0.005 
SBI90 (Crisis)  -0.040  0.000 
S & P 500 (Crisis)  0.333  0.070 
Yen/$ (Crisis)  -0.256  0.498  
JSX-1 (Crisis)  -0.082  0.195** 
JSX-2 (Crisis)  -0.009  -0.192** 
Rupiah-1 (Crisis)  -0.134  0.136* 
Rupiah-2 (Crisis)  0.243**  -0.096 
Rupiah-3 (Crisis)  -0.090     
Rupiah-4 (Crisis)  -0.022     
        
        
Observations 574  572 
          
*10% significance         
** 5% significance         
***1% significance         
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We can see from the results that crisis was more intense during the earlier period, 
which fits with the graphs from a previous section showing many of the largest 
movements in the markets coming early in 1997 and early 1998.  Except in the case of 
bad news for the JSX, both good and bad news had a much stronger impact during the 
Suharto period of the crisis for both the JSX and the rupiah.    This is especially true of 
the rupiah where the marginal effect of the news during the crisis period is 2-3 times 
as strong as during the Habibie period.  For the stock exchange we observe that both 
the autoregressive lags and the rupiah lag are significant for the crisis period.  We can 
see this as the trending and the bargain hunting effects discussed above as having 
more of an impact during the early part of the crisis. 
  Having seen the effect of good and bad news on the exchange rate and stock 
exchange, we will look closer at what types of news affected the markets by 
disaggregating the good and bad news into the categories introduced above.  We will 
begin by looking at the entire crisis period and then looking again to seem if the 
coefficients change after the transition in Indonesian leadership.  Before examining the 
regression results, we will take a closer look at the number of news articles in each 
category, this information is given in the following table: 
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Table 19  Number of News Events by Category* 
 
      
 Rupiah JSX   
      
Good International  35 35  
Bad International  14 14  
Good Credit Rating  3 3  
Bad Credit Rating  21 21  
Good Economic  7 7  
Bad Economic  20 20  
Good Policy  16 17  
Bad Policy  9 9  
Good Political  17 17  
Bad Political  20 20  
Civil Unrest  53 52  
      
Total Good  78 79  
Total Bad  137 136  
      
Total 215 215   
      
*Totals vary slightly by JSX and rupiah because 
of different holiday schedules and because   
currency board news categorized differently for each. 
 
Broadly we can see that international agreements and policy news tended to be good 
news, while credit rating, economic and political tended to be bad news.  Also, overall 
the news is overwhelming bad.  Thus as we saw in the case of the rupiah above 
although the impact of the good news and bad news had almost the same coefficients 
in absolute value, bad news would have much more of an overall effect since most of 
the news is bad.  This point and the table above should be kept in mind during the 
discussion of the regression results for all news categories show below: 
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Table 20  Impact of News Categories (7/2/97-10/22/99) 
 
 Rupiah   JSX  Composite 
        
F   8.51  12.06 
(p-value) <.0001  <.0001 
        
adj-R squared  0.21  0.26 
        
        
Intercept 0.001  -0.003*** 
G International  -0.006  0.013*** 
B International  0.038**  -0.016 
G Credit Rating  -0.011*  0.022* 
B Credit Rating  -0.003  0.012** 
G Economic  0.006  0.010 
B Economic  0.013  0.001 
G Policy  -0.063*** 0.034*** 
B Policy  0.022   -0.016 
G Political  -0.029*** 0.037*** 
B Political  0.024**  -0.005 
Civil Unrest  0.015**  -0.009** 
SBI90 -0.018  -0.019 
S & P 500  -0.015  0.620*** 
Yen/$ 0.221  -0.310** 
JSX-1 -0.129*  0.265*** 
JSX-2 -0.019  -0.061 
Rupiah-1 0.044  0.115*** 
Rupiah-2 0.119*  -0.033 
Rupiah-3 -0.062     
Rupiah-4 -0.132     
        
Observations 574  572 
        
*10% significance         
** 5% significance         
***1% significance         
 
For the rupiah, bad international, good credit ratings, good policy, good 
politics, bad politics, and civil unrest are all the expected signs and significant.  Of 
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these variables good policy is nearly twice as large as any of the other coefficients in 
absolute value.  For the JSX, good international, good credit rating, good political, 
good politics, and civil unrest are the variables whose coefficients are significant and 
have the expected sign.
14  Thus while the rupiah had just as many bad news categories 
as good categories that were significant, the categories affecting the stock market are 
overwhelmingly good.  This continues a trend we have seen throughout this research. 
  We can also see that neither good nor bad economic news is significant for 
either the rupiah or the JSX composite index, and in two of the four cases the 
coefficients are the wrong sign.  Also overall credit ratings do not seem to play a direct 
role in the crisis.
15  Although the coefficients are significant for both the JSX and 
rupiah, there are only three cases of good credit ratings, so their impact would be quite 
limited.   Also the impact of bad credit ratings seems to be disproportionate to the 
attention they were given in the media, as the coefficient is not statistically significant 
in the case of the rupiah and is the wrong sign in the case of the JSX (see footnote 6).  
  Another way to get an overall view of the impact of each type of news is to 
combined the previous regression results with the Table 19 which lists the number of 
events in each category.  In the Table 21 below the overall effect is defined as the 
product of the regression coefficient for a news category and the number of news 
events in that category.  This should correct for those categories like good credit rating 
that have relatively large coefficients, but occur only a few times throughout the crisis. 
The following table is sorted by absolute value of the overall effect: 
                                                 
14 Bad credit rating is significant has an “unexpected” sign.  According to this coefficient the JSX gains 
when a bad credit rating is announced.  There are a couple of possible related reasons for this.  One is 
that as we saw in the section analyzing the headline events of the crisis, the JSX composite index did 
not drop after the Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s announcements that sent the rupiah into a tail spin.  
Relatedly,  the  credit ratings used in this study usually concern the currency not corporations, and they 
were definitely not targeted towards the Jakarta Stock exchange as a whole. 
15 Although they may have played an indirect role in the crisis by influencing investors views of 
Indonesia. 
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Table 21 Overall Effects of News Categories 
 
   
 Rupiah   JSX 
    
 Overall    Overall 
 Effect   Effect 
       
G Policy  -1.00  G Politics  0.63 
Civil Unrest  0.79  G Policy  0.57 
B International  0.53  Civil Unrest  -0.46 
G Politics  -0.49  G International  0.44 
B Politics  0.48  B Credit Rating  0.26 
B Economic  0.26  B International  -0.22 
G International  -0.22  B Policy  -0.14 
B Policy  0.20  B Politics  -0.10 
B Credit Rating  -0.07  G Economic  0.07 
G Economic  0.04  G Credit Rating  0.07 
G Credit Rating  -0.03  B Economic  0.02 
       
Total Good  -1.71    1.78 
Total Bad  2.19    -0.66 
       
Overall Effect =          
Regression Coefficient * Number of Events in Category 
 
Here again good policy and good politics have large effects on both the rupiah and the 
JSX, but the rupiah also sees large effects contributed to civil unrest, bad international 
and bad politics.  As we have seen in previous sections the effects of the bad news 
tend to have a larger total effect on the rupiah.  When overall effects are added up 
according to good and bad news categories, bad news has a larger overall effect on the 
rupiah.  In the case of the JSX the total effect of good news is more than two and a 
half times as great as the overall effect of the bad news.  These results mirror many of 
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those discussed in previous sections.  Also just as we have seen in previous sections 
the size of the overall effects for the rupiah tend to be larger than for those of the JSX. 
Outside of the news categories the other coefficients carry forward many of the 
trends we saw in the regressions containing only good and bad news.  The notable 
exception is the interest rate (SBI90) in the rupiah regression.  Now the interest rate 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant, though it still has the expected sign.  
Adding the news categories adds more information to the model.  Movements that 
may have been attributed to the interest rate in the previous model may have actually 
been caused, in part, by the various news categories. 
The above results give us a sense of what types of news were important during 
the entire period under consideration.  Just as we did for the more compact models that 
used only the broad categories good and bad news, we will now turn our sights to see 
how these effects might have been different in the early crisis period (July 2, 1997 – 
May 19, 1998) versus the later crisis period (May 20, 1998 – October 22, 1999).  
Initially, we will use the exact same (expect for the expanded news categories) model 
using a dummy variable for the first crisis period as was described above.  For 
comparison, we will also give the results running a separate regression for each period, 
giving us two regression models for both the rupiah and the stock market.  Because of 
a lack of data the coefficients for good credit rating and good economic news are not 
estimated for the first crisis period.  Since we are most interested in if the coefficients 
are different across the two periods, only the coefficients for marginal difference in the 
periods are listed below: 
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Table 22  Comparing Crisis Periods 
       
Crisis Dummy = (7/2/97-5/19/98)         
          
 Rupiah    JSX  Composite 
          
F   6.24    7.28  
(p-value) <.0001    <.0001   
          
adj-R squared  0.26    0.28  
          
Crisis Dummy  0.007***  -0.005 ** 
G International (Crisis) -0.005    0.015 ** 
B International (Crisis) 0.045*    -0.028  
B Credit Rating (Crisis) 0.014    0.009  
B Economic (Crisis)  -0.010    -0.004  
G Policy (Crisis)  -0.072***  0.017  
B Policy (Crisis)  0.035    0.025  
G Political (Crisis)  -0.005    0.009  
B Political (Crisis)  0.050***  -0.017  
Civil Unrest (Crisis)  0.007    -0.002  
SBI90 (Crisis)  -0.020    -0.001  
S & P 500 (Crisis)  0.095    0.171  
Yen/$ (Crisis)  0.088    0.295  
JSX-1 (Crisis)  -0.086    0.196 ** 
JSX-2 (Crisis)  0.052    -0.135  
Rupiah-1 (Crisis)  -0.169    0.139 ** 
Rupiah-2 (Crisis)  0.185*    -0.049  
Rupiah-3 (Crisis)  -0.152       
Rupiah-4 (Crisis)  0.023       
          
          
Observations 574    572   
          
*10% significance        
** 5% significance           
***1% significance           
  From these results we see that rupiah reacts stronger to bad international, good 
policy and bad political during the earlier crisis period.  The magnitude of these 
increases in these coefficients during the Suharto period is also very great.  Both the 
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coefficients for bad international and bad political are more than 5 times greater than 
the coefficients on those variables during the second crisis period, while the effect of 
good policy is more than 3 times as large.  This is consistent with the results examined 
in section 2, which looked at how many of largest rupiah movements were clustered in 
the period from the end of 1997 to the middle of 1998.  For the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange, only the coefficient on good international news is significantly greater than 
during the first crisis period.  As the crisis dragged on, news on international 
agreements seems to have had less of an effect of the stock market. 
  A related way to view the changes between the first and second crisis period is 
to run a separate regression for each period.  Rather than focusing on the marginal 
change from one period to the other, this will allow us to both compare the size of the 
coefficients and to see which coefficients are significant in each period.  Although 
similar information could have been gained from the previous regression, the focus 
here is more squarely on the two periods as separate entities.  The results are listed in 
the table below: 
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Table 23   Comparison of Crisis Period Using Two Regressions 
    
Period 1 = 7/2/97 - 5/19/98    Period 2 = 5/20/98 - 10/22/99      
                     
     Rupiah           JSX Composite    
                     
     Period 1  Period 2  Period 1    Period 2 
                     
F      5.84  4.00  7.18     7.12 
(p-value)     <.0001  <.0001  <.0001      <.0001 
                     
adj-R squared    0.29  0.14  0.31     0.24 
                     
                       
Intercept     0.006**  -0.002  -0.006  ***    -0.001 
G International    -0.009  -0.003  0.021 ***    0.006 
B International    0.051**  0.006  -0.026 *    0.003 
G Credit Rating       -0.004        0.020* 
B Credit Rating    -0.001  -0.015*  0.017 ***    0.008 
G Economic       0.003        0.011 
B Economic    0.010  0.019**  -0.002     0.002 
G Policy     -0.095***  -0.023***  0.042 ***    0.025***
B Policy     0.035  0.000  -0.004     -0.029 
G Politics     -0.029  -0.024***  0.042 ***    0.033***
B Politics     0.055***  0.005  -0.015     0.001 
Civil Unrest    0.020  0.013***  -0.011     -0.008 
SBI90     -0.022  -0.002  -0.019      -0.017 
S & P 500    0.004  -0.091  0.764 ***    0.587***
Yen/$     0.344 0.257  -0.055      -0.349** 
JSX-1     -0.172  -0.086  0.389  ***    0.190***
JSX-2     0.025  -0.027  -0.153  **    -0.017 
Rupiah-1     -0.029  0.140*  0.174  ***    0.034 
Rupiah-2     0.144*  -0.041  -0.046      0.003 
Rupiah-3     -0.108  0.045          
Rupiah-4     -0.115  -0.137***          
                     
Observations   217  356  216     355 
                       
*10% significance                   
** 5% significance                 
***1%  significance                   
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  The same basic trends are seen in these regressions as those in using a dummy 
variable instead of two regressions.  Yet a few things come to the surface that were not 
as obvious before.  The first thing that leaps out is the across the board importance of 
good policy, which is statistically significant in both periods for both the rupiah and 
the JSX.  We have continually seen significant reactions to policy announcements at 
each stage of this research.  Just as in the case of using the dummy variable, the 
importance of international agreement news tends to have more significant effects 
during the initial period.  Good and bad international for the JSX and bad international 
for the rupiah are all statistically significant during the first period but not in the 
second.  These results also show the continued problem with the bad credit rating 
variable.  Here the coefficient has the unexpected sign in each of the four cases above 
and is significant in two of these cases.   
  Thus these results support many of the trends we have seen in this section and 
others.  However, now we have bad economic announcements being significant for the 
rupiah in the second period.  We may normally expect that economic announcements 
would be significant in the beginning of a crisis, with less economic driven news 
taking over deeper into the crisis.  However this situation seems to be reversed here.  
The significance of this bad economic news is consistent with the results from the 
previous section, where all five of the largest single-day rupiah movements caused by 
economic news were depreciations.  Also much of this economic news pertained more 
to corporate debt, which may explain why this news was significant in the second 
period after the exchange rate had completely collapsed. 
  Comparing the coefficients across time periods gives us more precise 
information about bad economic news, however the opposite seems to happen with the 
coefficient on civil unrest.  Civil unrest had been statistically significant for both the 
exchange rate and the stock market when regressions were run for the entire time 
  
58 
frame under consideration, July 2, 1997 through October 22, 1999.  Now in the results 
from separate regressions for each period, the coefficient on civil unrest is only 
significant for the rupiah during the second period and not at all during the first period.  
This change seems less startling when we relax are definitions of significance.  For 
both of the periods for the JSX the coefficients would be significant at 13%, not far 
above our standard cutoff of 10%, the p-value for the rupiah for the first period is .23.  
This decrease in significance may also be attributed to the decrease in the degrees of 
freedom when regressions are run for each time period. Overall from these regressions 
and the evidence presented through out this research it still seems apparent that civil 
unrest played a significant role in moving both the exchange rate and the stock market. 
  In addition to bringing out new information about the regression coefficients, 
running a separate regression for each period also brings out more information about 
the overall fit of the models. In Table 23 we see that the adjusted-R
2 is approximately 
the same for both the JXS and the rupiah during the early crisis period, however it is 
significantly lower for the rupiah in the second period.  A partial explanation of this 
can be seen in the graph of the rupiah and JSX composite index for the entire crisis 
period given below: 
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Figure 8  Overview of JSX and Rupiah 
 
In this chart we can see that initially the rupiah and the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
move together; the rupiah appreciates and the stock market falls.  However by June of 
1998 we see that gains by the JSX are mirrored by falls in the rupiah and losses by the 
JSX are accompanied by appreciations for the rupiah.  Eventually the rupiah takes a 
relatively even course during 1999, while the JSX experiences larges gains.  From this 
perspective we can see how the news model fits both of the markets equally well 
during the initial period, but during the second period the fit is better for JSX.    This is 
also reflected in the way many of the largest rupiah movements were clustered in the 
early part of crisis, while large swings the stock market were more spread out.   
 
Conclusions 
  While this research does paint a largely consistent picture of the crisis while 
using different forms of analysis, there are certainly some cautions to be heeded in 
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drawing conclusions.  One key is that out of necessity the unit of observation here has 
been a day but markets and news occur throughout a day.  Thus we miss the intraday 
variance that took place in the markets.  We may also be attributing some market 
movements to observed news event that were caused by other unobserved events, 
given the large number of news events that happened on a given day.  The assumption 
that the news data used in this research is the same news that foreign exchange and 
stock traders used is important for our research.  Despite the subjective nature of using 
the news data, we have seen our aggregated results are similar to those found in other 
research on contagion and the Asian crisis. 
  In comparing the exchange rate and the JSX composite index in this research 
we have largely ignored parts of the relationship between the two.  While we did allow 
for lagged effects of the markets on one another, we have not allowed for any 
contemporaneous effects between the two.  A more ambitious project may model a 
more dynamic relationship.  Certainly one reason why the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
rebounds in this research is that we have concentrated on the nominal value of the 
composite index not its value in US dollars, which certainly must have dropped over 
the period.  Yet the composite index was used rather the dollar value of the stock 
exchange to help separate the effects of the exchange rate from those on the stock 
market.  Kutan and Brasurkra (2004) do look at the returns of the JSX composition 
index in terms of the US dollar and the rupiah and they also find that government 
actions and political instability where significant forces in the market. 
  Kutan and Brasurkra also note the recovery of the JSX index by mid-1999 that 
is a key part of our results.  This could also be said to coincide with the results of 
Bowe and Domuta (2004).  They find little evidence of investor herding and conclude 
that in relation to the Jakarta Stock Exchange that overall “foreign investors did not 
severely exacerbate market movements at the time of the 1997 Asian crisis.”  Overall 
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we have seen a stock market that was steadier throughout the crisis than the exchange 
rate. 
Our research seems to be largely consistent with other analysis of the 
motivating factors behind the exchange rate and stock market during the crisis.  At the 
same time we take the analysis down to a very fine level of detail on the role of news 
events in the Indonesian crisis.  This research provides a detailed accounted of the 
roller coaster ride that the rupiah and the Jakarta Stock Exchange took over the 
roughly two years after the onset of the Asian financial crisis.  What we have seen is 
an extremely volatile rupiah when compared to the JSX composite index.  The JSX 
tended to rebound from bad events and respond strongly to good ones.  The rupiah 
was less likely to regain the ground it lost to bad news.  We have also seen that the 
most important news for the markets tended to be related to domestic issues.  For both 
markets, the news events that had both the largest positive and negative effects where 
domestic in origin.  Indonesian politics, policy announcements and civil unrest all had 
significant impacts on the markets.  Agreements with international agencies like the 
IMF and World Bank also had played a large role in the movements of the rupiah and 
the JSX in the two plus years following July 1997.  The role of international credit 
rating agencies is more ambiguous.  These results do not speak to the initial cause of 
the crisis, but certainly inform us of its evolution. This research would lead us to agree 
with Mohammad Sadli that “the depth of the Indonesian crisis was largely attributable 
to political factors, political instability surrounding Soeharto, the impending 
succession, evident corruption, and repression of all political opposition.”(1999 p. 16)  
Such a political crisis did not respond to the treatments normally prescribed for 
financial crises and left many practitioners and academics alike looking for answers.
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t
o
c
k
 
s
e
l
l
 
o
f
f
.
(
R
u
p
i
a
h
)
1
7
4
/
1
6
/
1
9
9
9
4
8
0
7
.
2
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
s
u
r
g
e
 
i
s
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
a
 
"
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
f
l
u
x
"
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
e
a
c
e
f
u
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
.
1
8
9
/
3
/
1
9
9
7
5
1
3
7
.
0
%
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
s
 
l
i
f
i
t
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
4
9
%
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
o
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
I
P
O
'
s
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
1
9
1
/
1
6
/
1
9
9
8
4
1
4
6
.
9
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
r
e
a
c
t
 
f
a
v
o
r
a
b
l
y
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
i
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
c
e
d
 
b
y
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
C
a
m
d
e
s
s
u
s
.
(
I
A
)
2
0
8
/
2
9
/
1
9
9
7
4
9
4
-
6
.
9
%
T
r
a
d
e
r
s
 
w
o
r
r
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
w
i
l
l
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
 
t
o
 
s
l
i
d
e
,
 
a
l
s
o
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
e
x
e
s
.
(
R
u
p
i
a
h
)
2
1
5
/
1
3
/
1
9
9
8
4
0
2
-
6
.
6
%
S
i
x
 
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
e
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
a
n
t
i
-
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
.
(
C
U
)
2
2
1
0
/
3
0
/
1
9
9
7
5
0
3
6
.
5
%
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
c
l
o
s
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
t
h
a
t
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
 
h
a
v
e
 
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
 
a
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
.
(
I
A
)
2
3
1
1
/
2
0
/
1
9
9
8
4
0
4
6
.
5
%
"
D
r
i
v
e
n
 
b
y
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
.
"
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
2
4
5
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
8
4
1
4
6
.
4
%
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
s
a
y
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
s
 
s
o
o
n
 
a
s
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
a
n
 
h
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
n
o
t
 
r
u
n
 
a
g
a
i
n
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
2
5
1
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
8
4
3
9
6
.
1
%
F
i
v
e
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
t
w
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
v
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
,
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
 
a
 
p
l
a
n
n
e
d
 
m
e
r
g
e
r
.
(
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
)
 
 
63 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
4
 
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
R
a
n
k
D
a
t
e
J
S
X
 
%
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
M
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
e
2
6
4
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
9
5
0
8
6
.
0
%
S
h
a
r
e
s
 
e
n
d
e
d
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
o
n
 
"
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
n
f
l
u
x
.
"
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
2
7
2
/
1
1
/
1
9
9
8
4
8
8
-
5
.
8
%
P
r
o
t
e
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
r
u
m
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
m
o
r
e
 
r
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
s
h
a
k
e
 
u
p
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
(
C
U
)
2
8
1
/
1
4
/
1
9
9
8
4
0
4
5
.
7
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
i
s
e
s
 
o
n
 
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
C
a
m
d
e
s
s
u
s
.
(
I
A
)
2
9
3
/
2
6
/
1
9
9
8
5
3
3
5
.
7
%
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
s
 
a
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
d
e
b
t
 
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
p
l
a
n
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
.
(
I
A
)
3
0
5
/
3
/
1
9
9
9
5
2
3
5
.
7
%
R
e
l
e
a
s
e
d
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
e
,
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
z
i
n
g
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
.
(
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
)
3
1
1
0
/
9
/
1
9
9
8
3
0
5
5
.
6
%
R
a
l
l
y
 
w
a
s
 
"
u
n
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
"
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
w
a
s
 
n
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
.
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
3
2
8
/
2
5
/
1
9
9
7
5
4
3
-
5
.
5
%
I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
 
m
o
n
e
y
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
t
i
m
e
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
m
a
n
y
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
3
0
%
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
3
3
1
0
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
9
5
8
4
5
.
5
%
W
i
r
a
n
t
o
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
s
 
t
o
 
r
u
n
 
a
s
 
H
a
b
b
i
e
'
s
 
V
i
c
e
-
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
.
 
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
c
e
n
e
 
b
e
g
i
n
s
 
t
o
 
c
l
e
a
r
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
3
4
1
0
/
2
1
/
1
9
9
9
6
1
6
5
.
5
%
W
i
r
a
n
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
A
k
b
a
r
 
T
a
n
j
u
n
g
 
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
 
f
r
o
m
 
V
i
c
e
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
r
a
c
e
,
 
s
e
e
m
s
 
M
e
g
a
w
a
t
i
 
w
i
l
l
 
w
i
n
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
3
5
9
/
2
1
/
1
9
9
8
2
5
7
-
5
.
5
%
W
i
d
e
s
p
r
e
a
d
 
s
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
a
s
 
i
n
d
i
s
c
r
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
.
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
w
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
3
6
1
0
/
2
9
/
1
9
9
7
4
7
2
5
.
4
%
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
s
 
u
p
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
 
5
%
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
S
&
P
 
5
0
0
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
d
a
y
.
(
W
a
l
l
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
)
3
7
5
/
7
/
1
9
9
8
4
3
7
5
.
3
%
D
e
s
p
i
t
e
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
h
i
k
e
,
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
e
n
d
s
 
u
p
 
o
n
 
a
r
b
i
t
r
a
g
e
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
.
(
W
r
o
n
g
 
W
a
y
)
3
8
4
/
9
/
1
9
9
9
4
2
1
5
.
3
%
W
i
r
a
n
t
o
 
a
s
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
v
e
r
n
i
g
h
t
 
r
i
s
e
 
o
n
 
W
a
l
l
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
,
 
W
S
)
3
9
7
/
2
6
/
1
9
9
9
5
9
3
-
5
.
3
%
A
 
m
a
j
o
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
4
8
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
i
e
s
 
f
a
i
l
 
t
o
 
c
e
r
t
i
f
y
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
E
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
4
0
1
1
/
2
3
/
1
9
9
8
4
2
5
5
.
3
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
e
a
c
h
e
s
 
a
 
f
i
f
t
e
e
n
 
w
e
e
k
 
h
i
g
h
 
d
e
s
p
i
t
e
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
e
 
r
e
l
i
g
i
o
u
s
 
v
i
o
l
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
.
 
(
W
r
o
n
g
 
W
a
y
)
4
1
1
/
2
6
/
1
9
9
8
4
7
4
5
.
0
%
S
h
a
r
e
s
 
r
i
s
e
s
 
o
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
4
2
6
/
1
7
/
1
9
9
8
4
1
9
5
.
0
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
i
s
e
s
 
d
e
s
p
i
t
e
 
f
a
l
l
i
n
g
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
,
 
p
u
s
h
e
d
 
b
y
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
d
u
a
l
-
l
i
s
t
e
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
.
 
(
N
o
 
N
e
w
s
)
4
3
2
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
8
4
9
6
5
.
0
%
S
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
r
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
h
i
s
 
p
l
a
n
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
o
a
r
d
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
4
4
5
/
2
2
/
1
9
9
8
4
4
5
5
.
0
%
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
r
e
s
i
g
n
s
 
a
s
 
p
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
H
a
b
b
i
e
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
s
 
n
e
w
 
c
a
b
i
n
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
4
5
1
2
/
1
6
/
1
9
9
7
3
5
6
5
.
0
%
N
e
w
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
(
r
u
m
o
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
s
e
r
i
o
u
l
y
 
i
l
l
)
 
w
i
l
l
 
m
a
k
e
 
a
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
p
p
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
p
u
r
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
4
6
1
/
2
5
/
1
9
9
9
3
8
2
-
5
.
0
%
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
u
n
r
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
A
m
b
o
n
 
(
w
o
r
s
t
 
r
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
M
a
y
 
1
9
9
8
)
,
 
f
a
l
l
i
n
g
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
y
u
a
n
 
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
.
(
C
U
)
4
7
6
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
8
4
4
0
4
.
9
%
S
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
d
r
i
v
e
s
 
b
a
r
g
i
n
 
h
u
n
t
e
r
s
 
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
u
n
d
e
r
v
a
l
u
e
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
.
 
(
R
u
p
i
a
h
)
4
8
1
1
/
2
4
/
1
9
9
7
4
1
0
4
.
8
%
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
u
r
g
e
s
 
S
O
E
'
s
 
t
o
 
p
u
t
 
a
s
i
d
e
 
1
%
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
 
t
o
 
b
u
y
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
'
s
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
4
9
9
/
1
/
1
9
9
8
3
2
6
-
4
.
8
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
 
a
 
6
.
4
%
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
 
o
n
 
W
a
l
l
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
.
 
(
W
S
)
5
0
9
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
8
2
7
2
-
4
.
8
%
W
o
r
r
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
s
e
n
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
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T
a
b
l
e
 
2
5
 
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
:
 
5
0
 
L
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
S
i
n
g
l
e
 
D
a
y
 
M
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
R
a
n
k
D
a
t
e
R
u
p
i
a
h
%
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
M
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
1
2
/
1
0
/
1
9
9
8
7
5
8
3
-
2
1
.
1
%
S
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
f
i
e
s
 
a
t
 
H
a
n
k
e
 
i
s
 
n
a
m
e
d
 
a
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
a
d
v
i
s
o
r
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
2
1
/
8
/
1
9
9
8
9
6
5
0
1
9
.
9
%
I
M
F
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
d
i
c
u
s
s
 
d
e
l
a
y
i
n
g
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
.
(
I
A
)
3
2
/
1
6
/
1
9
9
8
9
8
5
0
1
8
.
7
%
I
M
F
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
e
n
s
 
t
o
 
p
u
l
l
 
a
i
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
w
 
o
f
 
r
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
J
a
v
a
 
p
u
s
h
 
d
o
w
n
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
C
U
)
4
1
/
2
3
/
1
9
9
8
1
3
5
6
7
1
7
.
0
%
S
h
o
r
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
 
p
r
o
m
p
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
t
o
 
r
e
p
a
y
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
d
e
b
t
.
(
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
)
5
1
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
8
9
9
6
7
1
6
.
8
%
H
a
b
i
b
i
e
 
i
s
 
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
c
a
n
d
i
d
a
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
V
i
c
e
-
P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
6
5
/
1
3
/
1
9
9
8
1
0
7
8
3
1
6
.
8
%
S
i
x
 
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
o
l
i
c
e
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
a
n
t
i
-
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
.
(
C
U
)
7
1
/
1
5
/
1
9
9
8
8
3
8
3
1
6
.
3
%
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
r
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
n
e
w
 
I
M
F
 
p
l
a
n
 
s
h
o
w
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
i
m
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
.
(
I
A
)
8
5
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
8
1
2
4
8
3
1
5
.
1
%
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
u
n
r
e
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
l
y
 
w
e
i
g
h
 
d
o
w
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
.
(
C
U
)
9
1
/
9
/
1
9
9
8
8
3
3
3
-
1
3
.
6
%
I
M
F
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
d
o
w
n
p
l
a
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
d
e
l
a
y
i
n
g
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
.
(
I
A
)
1
0
1
2
/
1
5
/
1
9
9
7
5
7
0
1
1
3
.
6
%
C
o
n
c
e
r
n
 
o
v
e
r
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
'
s
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
(
d
o
c
t
o
r
'
s
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
l
y
 
o
r
d
e
r
e
d
 
1
0
 
d
a
y
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
t
)
 
d
r
i
v
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
1
1
1
/
1
4
/
1
9
9
8
7
2
0
8
-
1
3
.
6
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
o
p
t
i
m
i
s
t
i
c
 
o
v
e
r
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
 
o
n
 
1
/
1
5
 
b
y
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
.
(
I
A
)
1
2
1
/
6
/
1
9
9
8
7
5
5
0
1
3
.
3
%
M
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
1
,
0
0
0
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
g
o
 
o
n
 
a
 
r
a
m
p
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
B
a
n
d
u
n
g
 
d
a
m
a
g
i
n
g
 
s
t
o
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
a
i
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
u
n
r
e
s
t
.
(
C
U
)
1
3
1
/
2
1
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
4
6
7
1
3
.
2
%
S
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
H
a
b
i
b
i
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
n
a
m
e
d
 
V
P
.
 
A
l
s
o
 
s
o
m
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
r
e
p
a
y
i
n
g
 
d
e
b
t
s
 
i
n
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
1
4
1
/
5
/
1
9
9
8
6
6
6
3
1
2
.
1
%
F
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
t
e
r
m
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
d
e
b
t
 
d
r
i
v
e
s
 
d
o
w
n
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
.
(
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
)
1
5
5
/
6
/
1
9
9
8
9
0
5
0
1
1
.
9
%
R
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
o
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
M
e
d
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
 
c
l
a
s
h
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
l
i
c
e
 
i
n
 
J
a
k
a
r
t
a
 
f
u
e
l
 
f
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
(
C
U
)
1
6
1
/
2
7
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
7
8
3
-
1
1
.
6
%
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
'
s
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
s
 
n
e
w
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
1
7
2
/
2
/
1
9
9
8
1
0
0
4
2
-
1
1
.
4
%
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
i
n
 
q
u
i
e
t
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
(
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
 
N
e
w
 
Y
e
a
r
)
 
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
o
p
t
i
m
i
s
m
 
o
v
e
r
 
b
a
n
k
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
1
8
6
/
1
0
/
1
9
9
8
1
3
1
6
7
1
1
.
0
%
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
d
r
i
v
e
n
 
d
o
w
n
 
b
y
 
f
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
Y
u
a
n
 
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
U
S
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
Y
e
n
.
(
Y
e
n
)
1
9
6
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
8
1
4
8
0
0
-
1
1
.
0
%
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
g
a
i
n
s
 
o
n
 
r
u
m
o
r
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
U
S
 
a
n
d
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
 
t
o
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
t
h
e
 
Y
e
n
.
(
Y
e
n
)
2
0
1
2
/
1
2
/
1
9
9
7
5
0
1
7
1
0
.
7
%
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
c
a
n
c
e
l
s
 
A
S
E
A
N
 
s
u
m
m
i
t
 
t
r
i
p
,
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
f
y
i
n
g
 
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
e
 
i
s
 
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
l
y
 
i
l
l
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
2
1
1
2
/
9
/
1
9
9
7
4
5
7
2
1
0
.
4
%
R
u
m
o
r
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
i
s
 
g
r
a
v
e
l
y
 
i
l
l
 
p
a
n
i
c
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
2
2
3
/
9
/
1
9
9
8
1
0
7
3
3
1
0
.
3
%
I
M
F
 
d
e
l
a
y
s
 
a
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
o
f
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
b
a
i
l
 
o
u
t
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
.
(
I
A
)
2
3
6
/
1
7
/
1
9
9
8
1
6
6
3
2
1
0
.
3
%
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
r
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
t
e
s
t
 
i
n
 
J
a
v
a
 
d
r
i
v
e
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
1
6
,
0
0
0
.
(
C
U
)
2
4
1
1
/
3
/
1
9
9
7
3
2
6
1
-
9
.
7
%
N
e
w
 
I
M
F
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
 
r
a
i
s
e
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
.
(
I
A
)
2
5
1
2
/
2
6
/
1
9
9
7
5
1
0
2
-
9
.
5
%
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
B
a
n
k
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
C
h
r
i
s
t
m
a
s
 
h
o
l
i
d
a
y
.
(
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
)
 
65 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
5
 
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
)
R
a
n
k
D
a
t
e
R
u
p
i
a
h
%
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
M
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
2
6
1
/
2
/
1
9
9
8
5
9
4
2
9
.
4
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
e
a
c
t
s
 
t
o
 
S
&
P
'
s
 
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
'
s
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
.
(
C
R
)
2
7
1
2
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
7
5
0
4
1
-
8
.
9
%
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
p
p
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
h
e
 
t
o
o
k
 
a
 
1
0
 
d
a
y
 
r
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
2
8
5
/
2
8
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
4
2
5
8
.
8
%
R
i
o
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
S
u
m
a
t
r
a
 
w
e
a
k
e
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
.
(
C
U
)
2
9
9
/
8
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
6
7
5
8
.
5
%
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
e
s
 
a
m
i
d
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
e
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
u
n
r
e
s
t
.
(
C
U
)
3
0
5
/
2
0
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
3
1
7
-
8
.
4
%
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
r
a
l
l
i
e
s
 
a
s
 
S
u
h
a
r
t
o
'
s
 
d
e
p
a
r
t
u
r
e
 
s
e
e
m
s
 
i
m
m
i
n
e
n
t
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
3
1
2
/
1
3
/
1
9
9
8
8
3
0
0
8
.
3
%
A
l
a
n
 
G
r
e
e
n
s
p
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
o
p
 
U
S
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
c
r
i
t
i
c
i
z
e
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
'
s
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
p
l
a
n
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
3
2
8
/
1
1
/
1
9
9
9
7
9
1
7
7
.
8
%
W
o
r
r
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
B
a
n
k
 
B
a
l
i
 
s
c
a
n
d
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
d
r
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
m
p
t
s
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
s
e
l
l
 
o
f
f
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
3
3
7
/
1
6
/
1
9
9
8
1
3
3
9
2
-
7
.
4
%
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
s
 
o
n
 
I
M
F
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
o
f
 
$
1
.
3
 
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
n
e
w
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
t
o
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
.
(
I
A
)
3
4
3
/
2
0
/
1
9
9
8
9
4
9
2
-
7
.
1
%
A
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
 
5
%
 
t
a
x
 
o
n
 
r
u
p
i
a
h
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
s
e
e
n
 
a
s
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
a
 
b
r
o
a
d
e
r
 
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
p
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
n
g
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
3
5
1
0
/
2
1
/
1
9
9
8
7
1
6
8
-
7
.
0
%
S
t
o
p
-
l
o
s
s
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
 
s
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
h
e
d
g
e
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
l
 
o
f
f
s
 
b
y
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
.
(
P
o
l
i
c
y
)
3
6
1
0
/
2
2
/
1
9
9
8
7
6
5
6
6
.
8
%
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
 
b
y
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
t
h
a
t
 
R
u
p
i
a
h
 
a
p
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
h
u
r
t
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
s
p
u
r
s
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
.
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
)
3
7
1
1
/
3
/
1
9
9
8
8
4
2
5
6
.
8
%
T
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
P
e
o
p
l
e
'
s
 
C
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
s
s
e
m
b
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
n
e
w
s
.
 
(
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
,
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
3
8
3
/
4
/
1
9
9
8
9
4
2
1
6
.
8
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
w
o
r
r
y
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
I
M
F
 
d
e
l
a
y
i
n
g
 
$
3
 
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
l
o
a
n
 
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
m
e
n
t
 
d
u
e
 
l
a
t
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
.
(
I
A
)
3
9
8
/
1
9
/
1
9
9
8
1
1
6
0
8
-
6
.
6
%
A
 
s
h
a
r
p
 
r
i
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
Y
e
n
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
 
p
u
s
h
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
c
u
t
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
l
o
n
g
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
(
Y
e
n
)
4
0
1
/
7
/
1
9
9
8
8
0
5
0
6
.
6
%
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
i
s
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
 
i
n
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